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INTRODUCTION

Freedom of the press in America is at a critical crossroads in a number of
ways, but one way stands out as most fundamental: the stark impact of the
current debate over “Post-Truthism.” Press freedom jurisprudence has
long been structured around the concept of an audience member’s search
for truth in a marketplace of ideas. But social science research increasingly
suggests that individual information consumers are in fact often driven by
emotion, political identity, and the need for cognitive shortcuts, and that
they may not possess the truthseeking, rational processing, or informationupdating capabilities that the Court assumes. The individual search for
truth in the marketplace of ideas, some have suggested, is not happening—
or at least not happening in the way the United States Supreme Court’s
press jurisprudence has envisioned.
Whether this divide between jurisprudence and reality actually exists—
and what to do about it if it does—are pressing questions for both the
courts and the media, made all the more pressing as the changing media
landscape and the modern political climate exacerbate some components
of the Post-Truthism critique. The concern for some is that if press
freedom has rested on flawed assumptions about the nature of press
audiences, the growing awareness of those limitations may undermine the
marketplace-of-ideas justification for press freedom and its associated
press protections.
This Article investigates both questions. It finds that the factual premise—
that the Supreme Court has made erroneous assumptions about the
motivations and behaviors of information audiences—is accurate, but
argues that the theoretical consequence of this gap is just the opposite of
what some have suggested. Instead of undercutting the rationales for press
protection, this wider modern understanding of the information-processing
and truthseeking limitations of individual press consumers in the
marketplace of ideas actually underscores the need for protection of the
press as a market-enhancing institution. The Article argues that a fuller
appreciation of this dynamic can provide helpful insight into why the
Constitution might provide unique Press Clause protections and into some
of the functions that would qualify an institutional actor as “the press” for
purposes of that constitutional protection—an identification process that
will be increasingly vital as information consumers shift from legacy
media to new forms of content delivery. The Article probes these
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functions and offers a conceptual framework for granting Press Clause
protection to market-enhancing entities that compensate for the inherent
shortcomings of individual information consumers.
Part II describes the epistemological phenomenon of Post-Truthism and
the concerns it has raised about the validity of the marketplace-of-ideas
metaphor in the press freedom context.
Part III compares the U.S. Supreme Court’s characterizations of the
behaviors and capabilities of press audiences in the marketplace of ideas
with social science data about the actual behaviors and capabilities of
those audiences. Part III.A identifies the three most foundational
assumptions made by the Court—what we label the Truthseeking
Assumption, the Rational-Processing Assumption, and the Updating
Assumption—and then Part III.B describes the evidence that these
assumptions are seriously flawed.
Part IV questions the theoretical response to this gap between assumption
and audience reality, pushing back against the conclusion that a greater
awareness of audience limitations within the marketplace of ideas should
erode the foundation of press protection. It describes the ways that pressaudience limitations create compelling reasons to protect the marketplaceenhancing functions of the press and urges that the ongoing effort to
imbue the Press Clause with substantive meaning take these compensating
functions into account.
Part V concludes, arguing that the protection-of-press-functions approach
allows the Court to acknowledge the flaws of individual information
seekers without abandoning the aspiration of fact-based, public reasoning
and that it will provide a clear path forward for strengthening the press
institutions that promote and support those important norms of informed
public discourse. This doctrinal guidance is critically important in the
changing media landscape, as a functional definition of the press becomes
increasingly valuable.
II.

POST-TRUTHISM AND THE PRESS

It has become almost a commonplace to suggest that America is in the
midst of an epistemic crisis, a crisis that challenges long-settled
expectations about how we come to know truth and about the role that
objectively provable, verifiable facts can or should play in decisionmaking on matters of public concern.1 Indeed, many have suggested that
we may be at a crossroads—at the advent of a new “Post-Truthism” age in
which objective facts and deliberative decision-making are subordinated to
1

See, e.g., David Roberts, America is Facing an Epistemic Crisis, VOX.COM, Nov. 2,
2017, https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/11/2/16588964/america-epistemiccrisis; LEE MCINTYRE, POST-TRUTH (2018).
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emotion and partisanship in the search for truth.2 These shifts arguably
threaten development of the shared understandings about the world that
traditionally have been thought to undergird and sustain democratic
decision-making.
Many political elites and other influencers are increasingly promoting a
worldview in which a crude version of truth-as-feeling seems to substitute
for empirical evidence.3 Thus, for example, when CNN reporter Alisyn
Camerota confronted former Speaker of the House and Contract-withAmerica author Newt Gingrich with FBI statistics contradicting his claim
that violent crime was up in America, he insisted that his assertion was
“also a fact. . . . The current view is that liberals have a whole set of
statistics that theoretically may be right, but it’s not where human beings
are.”4 When the reporter pushed back, Gingrich repeatedly insisted that
people’s feelings about crime levels were “equally” as “true” as FBI
statistics and that, as a politician, he would “go with how people feel and
let [the reporter] go with the theoreticians.”5
Claims that we are in a Post-Truthism era have likewise been heightened
by developments in the Trump administration—including Kellyanne
Conway’s insistence that White House Press Secretary’s Sean Spicer’s
false claims about the size of the Trump inauguration crowd were
“alternative facts,” not misstatements or falsehoods,6 and attorney Rudy
Giuliani’s much-parodied suggestion that “Truth isn’t truth.”7
And, of course, the figure who has loomed largest in much Post-Truthism
commentary is President Trump himself, who has a notoriously loose
relationship with the truth and who often labels journalism “fake news”
when that coverage is unflattering, even when the underlying facts are
correct.8 Many have noted that President Trump seems to care little about

2

See, e.g., See Sarah Haan, The Post-Truth First Amendment, 94 IND. L.J. 1351 (2019);
MICHIKO KAKUTANI, THE DEATH OF TRUTH: NOTES ON FALSEHOOD IN THE AGE OF
TRUMP (2018); MCINTYRE, supra note 1; Derek Bacon, Yes, I’d Lie to You; The PostTruth World, ECONOMIST, Sept. 10, 2016, available at
https://www.economist.com/briefing/2016/09/10/yes-id-lie-to-you.
3
See Haan, supra note 2.
4
Quoted in LEE MCINTYRE, POST-TRUTH 4 (2018).
5
Id.
6
Eric Bradner, Conway: Trump White House Offered “Alternative Facts” on Crowd Size,
CNN.COM, Jan. 23, 2017, https://www.cnn.com/2017/01/22/politics/kellyanne-conwayalternative-facts/index.html.
7
Caroline Kenny, Rudy Guiliani Says “Truth Isn’t Truth,” CNN.com, Aug. 19, 2018,
https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/19/politics/rudy-giuliani-truth-isnt-truth/index.html.
8
See Leslie Stahl: Trump Admitted Mission to Discredit the Press, CBS NEWS,
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/lesley-stahl-donald-trump-said-attacking-press-todiscredit-negative-stories/ (last updated May 23, 2018) (quoting Trump as saying, “I do it
to discredit you all and demean you all so when you write negative stories about me, no
one will believe you.”).
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empirical facts, as evidenced by the fact that he has made more than
16,000 “false or misleading claims” since taking office.9
These changing mores about truth among politicians and other powerful
elites have coincided with the popularization of a growing body of social
science research that highlights real limitations in human rationality and
cognition and the influence that emotion and “motivated reasoning”—
driven by our desires to belong, to feel safe, and to express important
aspects of our identity—do, in fact, have on the ways we seek out and
process information about the world around us. Even as some politicians
have seemed to affirmatively endorse and even celebrate these limitations
and biases in human cognition, many commentators have bemoaned what
these social science findings might mean for both our individual ability to
be decent, informed democratic citizens and our collective search for
truth.10
Nowhere have these concerns played out more forcefully than in the
ongoing public conversation about the role of “the press” in our
democracy. From debates about “fake news,” to conversations about
declining trust in the media, to concerns about online “echo chambers”
that may reinforce and amplify people’s existing views, there is a lively
and impassioned debate about what this social science research and the
Post-Truthism era, more generally, mean for the future of the press and
press freedoms.11
This focus is hardly surprising, given the critical role that the press plays
in gathering and distributing the information that propels us forward in our
9

FACT CHECKER, WASH. POST,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/trump-claimsdatabase/?utm_term=.0d533cea94c7, last visited Feb. 21, 2020.
10
See, e.g, Bacon, supra note 2; ARI RABIN-HAVT & MEDIA MATTERS, LIES,
INCORPORATED: THE WORLD OF POST-TRUTH POLITICS (2016); Katharine Viner, How
Technology Disrupted the Truth, GUARDIAN, July 12, 2016,
https://www.theguardian.com/media/2016/jul/12/how-technology-disrupted-the-truth;
David Roberts, Donald Trump and the Rise of Tribal Epistemology, VOX, May 19, 2017,
9:58 AM, https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/3/22/14762030/donald-trumptribal-epistemology; Rebecca Newberger Goldstein, Truth Isn’t the Problem—We Are,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 2018, 10:36 AM, https://www.wsj.com/articles/truth-isnt-theproblemwe-are-1521124562; ., Marty Kaplan, The Most Depressing Brain Finding Ever,
Nov. 16, 2013, HUFFPOST, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/most-depressing-brainfin_b_3932273.
11
See, e.g., Ari Ezra Waldman, The Marketplace of Fake News, 20 J. CONSTL. LAW 845,
848 (noting that some scholars have argued that “the inability of consumers to discern
good ideas from bad” results in “market failure[s]” like the rise of fake news, which
justify “government intervention” and regulation”); Claudio Lombardi, The Illusion of a
“Marketplace of Ideas” and the Right to Truth, 3 AMERICAN AFFAIRS 1 (Spring 2019),
198-209, available at https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2019/02/the-illusion-of-amarketplace-of-ideas-and-the-right-to-truth/#notes
(arguing that, given market failures like “bounded rationality and the echo chamber
effect,” “[r]egulation of ‘information markets’ is needed in order to aid better
dissemination of news and sustain less profitable sources that have a special role in our
democracies”).
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collective search for truth. Indeed, the Supreme Court itself has long
emphasized the press’s role in enabling the “marketplace of ideas” as a
critical normative justification for press freedom.12
While this marketplace-of-ideas theory has long been criticized for a
variety of conceptual and practical flaws,13 the Post-Truthism ethos and
emerging social science suggest new criticisms focused on the Court’s
conception of a rational, truthseeking press audience. Some of the theory’s
core assumptions—about press audiences’ desires, about their behaviors,
and about their capabilities—appear out of step with the real world of
American media consumption.
This national conversation on Post-Truthism and the press presupposes
both a factual premise and a theoretical consequence. The factual premise
is that there is a gap between, on the one hand, what the Supreme Court’s
marketplace-of-ideas analogy seems to assume about press audiences and,
on the other, what is accurate about those audiences as a matter of
cognitive behavioral science. The theoretical consequence is that this
fundamental market failure might dictate greater government regulation of
the press—that is, that an increased recognition that press freedom has
rested on flawed assumptions about the nature of press audiences could
remove the underpinnings of the marketplace-of-ideas justification for that
freedom. These arguments—which might find particular resonance in
some corners at a moment of new, intensified attacks on the press and
press freedom14—suggest that our new awareness of audience limitations
might sound the death knell for any marketplace-based press protections.
Perhaps more than in any other area of First Amendment jurisprudence,
the Court’s marketplace-of-ideas approach in press cases does explicitly
and implicitly make assumptions that have never been fully explored or
challenged, in part because some of them seem so fundamental that they
have been perceived as incontrovertible: People consuming journalism
will seek after provable facts. They will rationally process the information
they gather from the news. They will use press coverage to challenge their
previous views and will update those views when provided with contrary
information. They will believe there is such a thing as truth. But modern
social science may teach that many of these most basic and deeply held
assumptions are, in fact, flawed, and that the Court has mischaracterized

12

See, e.g., Stuart Minor Benjamin, Algorithms and Free Speech, 161 U. PENN. LAW
REV. 1445, 1454 (2013) (observing that the “best-known conception” of the First
Amendment “and that most commonly invoked by the Supreme Court, is the marketplace
of ideas)”.
13
See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 25
(1982); Daniel E. Ho & Frederick Schauer, Testing the Marketplace of Ideas, 90 N.Y.U.
LAW REV. 1160 (2015); Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth,
1984 DUKE L. J. 1 (1984) (arguing that the market is “strongly biased in favor of . . .
entrenched interests”).
14
See, e.g., sources cited in note 11, supra.
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what individual press audience members in the marketplace of ideas want,
what they do, and what they are capable of doing.
Importantly, however, the theoretical consequence of this gap between
Court assumption and real-world reality is not the abandonment of the
marketplace of ideas as a justification for press freedom. To the contrary.
Instead of undercutting the rationales for press protection, this wider
modern understanding of the information-processing and truthseeking
limitations of individual press consumers in the marketplace of ideas
actually underscores the need for protection of the press as a marketenhancing institution. Citizens are unlikely, on their own, to be able to
find truth or acquire knowledge as individual actors in the way the
marketplace of ideas theory envisions. But market-enhancing press actors
can compensate for audience limitations in the marketplace of ideas—by
newsgathering, prioritizing, verifying, contextualizing, and accessing
places and information on the individual’s behalf. Appreciating this
dynamic can help illuminate why the Constitution might separately
provide unique protection under the Press Clause and provide insight into
some of the functions that would qualify an institutional actor for that
protection.
Thus, this critical jurisprudential and technological juncture warrants a
deeper investigation both of the gap between Supreme Court assumption
and information-consumer reality and of the benefits of a doctrinal focus
on market-enhancing press functions.
III.

THE GAP BETWEEN SUPREME COURT ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT
PRESS AUDIENCES AND THE REALITY

While strands of press-praising dicta in many Supreme Court cases discuss
the important role the press plays in informing citizens and promoting
democracy, 15 the Court has not offered one unifying theory of press
freedom. Instead, it has addressed the roles and rights of press actors in a
variety of categories of cases, like defamation,16 access,17 prior restraints
on publication,18 editorial discretion,19 taxation and other regulation of the
15

See Sonja R. West, Stealth Press Clause, 48 GA. L. REV. 729, 732-36 (2014); RonNell
Andersen Jones, Dangers of Press Clause Dicta, 48 GA. L. REV. 705 (2014); RonNell
Andersen Jones, What the Supreme Court Thinks about the Press Clause and Why It
Matters, 66 ALA. L. REV. 253 (2014).
16
See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 325 (1974); Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts,
388 U.S. 130, 137 (1967); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256 (1964).
17
See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 558 (1980); PressEnterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1, 3 (1986); PressEnterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise I), 464 U.S. 501, 503 (1984);
Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 3 (1978).
18
See Nebraska Press. Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 541 (1976); New York Times Co. v.
United States (Pentagon Papers Case), 403 U. S. 713, 714 (1971); Near v. Minnesota,
283 U.S. 697, 703 (1931).
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press,20 and publication of true private facts.21 Nevertheless, the Court
often references the press’s important role in the “marketplace of ideas”
and makes clear assumptions about the audiences of press coverage and
their role as consumers in the marketplace of ideas—assumptions that
deserve serious attention and analysis.
A. The Supreme Court’s Assumptions about Press Audiences
1. The Truthseeking Assumption
First, a core assumption in the Court’s press freedom cases is that press
audiences seek out empirical truth. They believe that such truth exists and
demand that it be provided to them. The Court envisions information
consumers as individuals who desire provable facts and are actively
expending resources in the search for additional evidence to enlarge their
catalogs of truthful, factual information and to test their previous beliefs
on important matters.
In the most classic formulation of this notion, the Court in the watershed
press case of New York Times v. Sullivan22 constitutionalized the law of
libel on the assumption of a press audience that would seek “uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open”23 debate on matters of public concern. This vision
of an audience member who is actively searching for truth in a workable
marketplace of ideas permeates every press-focused case from the Court.
The theoretical assumptions that are made about audiences more generally
in First Amendment doctrine—that they rationally seek truth, evaluate all
contributions to the marketplace, and reasonably interpret what they are
told24— are even more pronounced in the context of cases focused on
press coverage and the consumers of that coverage. Press audiences are

19

See Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 243 (1974); CBS v.
Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 97 (1973).
20
See Minneapolis Star & Trib. Co. v. Minnesota Comm’n of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575,
576 (1983); Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 240 (1936).
21
See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 517–18 (2001) (publishing intercepted and
taped cellular phone call); Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 526 (1989) (publishing
rape victim’s name based on public police report); Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443
U.S. 97, 98 (1979) (publishing name of juvenile offender); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn,
420 U.S. 469, 471 (1975) (publishing name of deceased rape victim).
22
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
23
Id. at 270.
24
Lyrissa Lidsky, Nobody’s Fool: The Rational Audience as First Amendment Ideal,
2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 799 (2010), Derek E. Bambauer, Shopping Badly: Cognitive Biases,
Communications, and the Fallacy of the Marketplace of Ideas, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 649
(2006); Paul Horwitz, Free Speech as Risk Analysis: Heuristics, Biases, and Institutions
in the First Amendment, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 1 (2003); David S. Han, The Mechanics of
First Amendment Audience Analysis, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1647 (2014).
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assumed to be pursuing what is “truthful,”25 searching available materials
for that truth, and doing all they can to avoid deception.26
So, for example, the Court’s anticipated newspaper reader in defamation
cases eagerly desires to know what is true, and the press needs a wide
swath of protection from liability in order to continue looking for that truth
on behalf of that reader. 27 Cases focused on protecting the editorial
discretion of news outlets do so on the expectation that those organizations
will be motivated to serve the truthseeking desires of their viewers and
subscribers.28 Press-freedom cases focused on the sacrosanct protection
for publishing truthful information that is lawfully obtained29 and the core
right of the press to be free from governmental prior restraints30 operate on
the premises that objective truth exists, that press consumers are interested
in and seeking after it, and that shutting down press coverage unfairly robs
those audiences of the chance to know or test that truth.31
Throughout the cases, the press is depicted as investigating and probing on
behalf of a truthseeking audience. 32 The assumption is that audience
25

Nebraska Press Ass’n, 427 U.S. at 587 (“Truthful reports of public judicial proceedings
have been afforded special protection . . . .”); Cohn, 420 U.S. at 496 (“[T]ruthfully
publishing information released to the public . . . .”); id. at 496 (“Once true information is
disclosed in public court documents open to public inspection, the press cannot be
sanctioned for publishing it.”).
26
Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. at 717 (Black, J., concurring) (“[P]aramount among the
responsibilities of a free press is the duty to prevent any part of the government from
deceiving the people . . . .”).
27
See, e.g., Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271–72 (“That erroneous statement is inevitable in free
debate, and that it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the
‘breathing space’ that they ‘need to survive . . . .’”) (citation omitted).
28
See Tornillo, 418 U.S at 255 (“The power of a privately owned newspaper to advance
its own political, social, and economic views is bounded by” the needs of its subscribers)
(quoting CBS v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 117 (1973)); see also RonNell
Andersen Jones, Press Speakers and the First Amendment Rights of Listeners, 90 U.
COLO. L. REV. 499, 522–23 (2019) (describing the relationship between the press and
those it serves).
29
See Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979); see also Bartnicki, 532
U.S. at 533–34 (holding that the state may not punish a publisher that lawfully obtained
an intercepted telephone conversation even when third party illegally intercepted and
recorded it); Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 541 (holding that “where a newspaper publishes
truthful information which it has lawfully obtained, punishment may lawfully be
imposed, if at all, only when narrowly tailored to a state interest of the highest order . . .
.”); Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103–104 (1979) (“If the information is
lawfully obtained . . . the state may not punish its publication” unless furthering a “state
interest of the highest order”), Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cox, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975)
(holding that states may not impose sanctions for accurately reporting the “name of a rape
victim obtained from public records” that are available for “public inspection”).
30
See Nebraska Press Ass’n, 427 U.S. at 541; Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. at 714; Near,
283 U.S. at 703.
31
See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass’n, 427 U.S. at 788 (describing the “chilling effect” of
subsequent punishment of the press and the “freezing” effect of prior restraints).
32
See Cox, 420 U.S. at 491 (stating that the public “relies necessarily upon the press to
bring to him in convenient form the facts of [government] operations.”); Richmond
Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 572–73 (stating that the public “acquire[s] [information] chiefly
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members are themselves driven to dig for more information, uncover
factual details, and get to the bottom of what is happening in their
communities. 33 The major press-freedom cases thus characterize
information consumers as fundamentally fact-motivated—as needing,
expecting, and seeking empirical facts.34
By the Court’s telling of things, the press audience strives primarily to be
“informed.” 35 Readers and viewers work to be knowledgeable 36 and
educated. 37 And the press’s job is to meet this “public need for
information and education with respect to the significant issues of the
times.”38 The “dissemination of information and opinion on questions of
public concern” to these eager recipients is “ordinarily a legitimate,
protected and indeed cherished activity,”39 because “the protection of the
public requires not merely discussion, but information.”40

through the print and electronic media” rather than by “firsthand observation” and as a
result, the media as a surrogate is “validate[d]”).
33
Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 572–73 (“Instead of acquiring information about
trials by firsthand observation or by word of mouth from those who attended, people now
acquire it chiefly through the print and electronic media. In a sense, this validates the
media claim of functioning as surrogates for the public.”); Cox, 420 U.S. at 491
(suggesting that a citizen would like to “observe at first hand the operations of his
government, but that citizens “rel[y] on the press to bring . . . facts of those operations”
in “convenient form”).
34
See Cox, 420 U.S. at 491–92 (discussing the responsibility of the press to “report fully
and accurately the proceedings of government,” which requires access to “official records
and documents open to the public.”), Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 727 (1972)
(Stewart, J., dissenting) (“[A] free press . . . provid[es] the people with the widest
possible range of fact and opinion . . . .”); Tornillo, 418 U.S at 241, n. 24 (A journal does
not merely print observed facts . . . As soon as the facts are set in their context, you have
interpretation and you have selection, and editorial selection opens the way to editorial
suppression.”)
35
See Houchins, 438 U.S. at 32 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]his protection is not for the
private benefit of those who might qualify as representatives of the ‘press’ but to insure
that the citizens are fully informed regarding matters of public interest and importance.”).
See also Cohn, 420 U.S. at 496 (referencing the need for “the media to inform citizens
about the public business”); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573
(1980) (calling the press the “chief[]” source of public information); Estes v. Texas, 381
U.S. 532, 539 (1965) (praising the press for “informing the citizenry of public events and
occurrences”); Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. at 717 (Black, J., concurring) (“In the First
Amendment the Founding Fathers gave the free press the protection it must have to fulfill
its essential role in our democracy. . . . The press was protected so that it could bare the
secrets of government and inform the people”); Nebraska Press Ass’n, 427 U.S. at 587
(Brennan, J., concurring) (“[T]he public’s right to be informed of [criminal]
proceedings”); Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 250 (calling for “the circulation of information to
which the public is entitled in virtue of the constitutional guaranties”).
36
Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 250 (describing the role of the press in “the acquisition of
knowledge by the people in respect of their governmental affairs”).
37
See Jones, What the Supreme Court Thinks of the Press, supra note 15, at 256–57;
RonNell Andersen Jones & Lisa Grow Sun, Enemy Construction and the Press, 49 ARIZ.
ST. L. REV. 1301, 1360–63 (2017).
38
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940).
39
Butts, 388 U.S. at 150.
40
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 272.
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The press audience member envisioned by the Court is not stingy in her
search for information; rather, she hopes for complete, accurate details41
on the matters that she considers. The assumed audience member does not
want one-sided information. Instead, the Court’s key press cases
repeatedly emphasize the need to protect the press in order to ensure that
there is “vigor”42 and “variety”43 in information flow. The Court says the
press “serves one of the most vital of all general interests: the
dissemination of news from as many different sources, and with as many
different facets and colors as is possible.”44
Discussing the need for reporters to be protected in their use of
confidential sources, Justice Stewart emphasizes that information
consumers seek “the widest possible range of fact and opinion.”45 His
construct for a qualified reporters’ privilege46 roots that protection in the
notion that audiences desire and are actively seeking “in-depth,
investigative reporting.”47
Although courts have consistently defined “newsworthiness” in broader
terms to include many other matters of interest,48 a central assumption in
the key press-freedom cases is that audience will desire news about the
“major public issues of our time.”49 Indeed, a permeating theme of the
Court’s press freedom cases is that press audiences will want detailed
information from the press about their public servants that they can use to
scrutinize the people and institutions of power and to demand
responsiveness from them.

41

Cohn, 420 U.S. at 492 (“Great responsibility is accordingly placed upon the news
media to report fully and accurately the proceedings of government”); Branzburg, 408
U.S. at 738 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (arguing the press needs protection to deliver on “the
First Amendment guarantee of the fullest flow of information”).
42
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279.
43
Id.; see also Butts, 388 U.S. at 151 (limitations on the press must not “deprive our free
society of the stimulating benefit of varied ideas”); Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 729 (Stewart,
J., dissenting) (“[T]here is obviously a continuing need for an independent press to
disseminate a robust variety of information and opinion through reportage, investigation,
and criticism”).
44
Times-Picayune Publ’g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 602–603 (1953).
45
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 729 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
46
Id. at 725–26; see also RonNell Andersen Jones, Rethinking Reporter’s Privilege, 111
MICH. L. REV. 1221, 1225 (2013) (noting that lower courts have recognized a “First
Amendment-based reporter’s privilege based on Justice Stewart’s dissent in Branzburg”).
47
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 733 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (warning against impairing
the “flow of news to the public, especially in sensitive areas involving government
officials, financial affairs, political figures, dissidents or minority groups that require indepth, investigative reporting”).
48
AMY GAJDA, THE FIRST AMENDMENT BUBBLE (2015).
49
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 275. See also Nebraska Press Ass’n, 427 U.S. at 587 (referring to
the “contemporary news value of the information the press seeks to disseminate” and
noting that “the damage [of a prior restraint] can be particularly great when the prior
restraint falls upon the communication of news and commentary on current events”).
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The press consumers depicted by the Court are genuinely interested in
useful assessments of government performance. They have “ardor as
citizens” 50 and care about “the proper conduct of public business.”51 The
assumption is broad, suggesting audience interest in keeping an eye on
public services from “the least to the most important” 52 and interest in
public actors in the legislative, 53 executive, 54 and judicial 55 branches.
These audiences are characterized as seeking knowledge that serves a
“watchdog”56 or “checking”57 function, and as being particularly in search
of truthful information about government mistakes or misbehavior. The
Court thoroughly embraces the notion that the citizenry wants information
about “official neglect,” “official misconduct,” or “the opportunities for
malfeasance and corruption,”58 and material that might “expose deception
in government,” 59 uncover “corruption among public officers and

50

Id. at 304 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
Cohn, 420 U.S. at 495.
52
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 304 (Goldberg, J., concurring). But see Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 85
(suggesting particularly strong interest in “those among the hierarchy of government
employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or
control over the conduct of governmental affairs.”) (footnote omitted).
53
Cox, 420 U.S. at 492 (“Without the information provided by the press most of us and
many of our representatives would be unable to vote intelligently . . . .”); Pentagon
Papers, 403 U.S. at 720 (Black, J., concurring) (stating we need a “free press . . . in order
to maintain the opportunity for free political discussion and to that end that government
may be responsible to the will of the people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained
by peaceful means. Therein lies the security of the Republic, the very foundation of
constitutional government.”) (quoting De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937)).
54
Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. at 728 (Stewart, J., concurring) (stating that “the only
effective restraint upon executive policy and power . . . may lie in an enlightened
citizenry . . . .”); Houchins, 438 U.S. at 30 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Without some
protection for the acquisition of information about the operation of public institutions
such as prisons by the public at large, the process of self-governance contemplated by the
Framers would be stripped of its substance.”); Near, 283 U.S. at 718–19 (discussing
“public officers, whose character and conduct remain open to debate and free discussion
in the press”); Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 864 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(“The people must therefore depend on the press for information concerning public
institutions.”).
55
Estes, 381 U.S. at 539 (“The free press has been a mighty catalyst in . . . exposing
corruption among public officers and employees and generally informing the citizenry of
public events and occurrences, including court proceedings.”); Nebraska Press Ass’n,
427 U.S. at 539 (noting the press “does not simply publish information about trials but
guards against the miscarriage of justice . . . .”) (quoting Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S.
333, 350 (1966); Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 350 (calling the press “the handmaiden of
effective judicial administration . . . .”).
56
Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447 (1991) (describing “the press as a watchdog of
government activity.”)
57
Id. at 447 (“The press plays a unique role as a check on government abuse . . . .”);
Times-Picayune Publ’g Co. v, United States, 345 U.S. 594, 602–603 (1953). See
generally Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 2 AM. B.
FOUND. RESEARCH J. 521–649 (1977).
58
Near, 283 U.S. at 719–20 .
59
Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. at 717 (Black, J., concurring).
51
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employees,”60 or “generally inform[ ] the citizenry of public events and
occurrences.”61
The Court presumes a desire by individual information consumers to dig
deeply into “the qualifications and performance” of those who hold
office62 and a thirst for information that will “serve as a powerful antidote
to any abuses of power by governmental officials” and “keep[ ] officials
elected by the people responsible to all the people whom they were
selected to serve.”63
A “basic assumption,” the Court notes, is that this accountability-seeking
audience “will often serve as an important restraint on government.”64
Knowing that this audience is attentive will curb the impulses of
government leaders and motivate them to be “responsive to the will of the
people.”65 Likewise, the people, the Court assumes, will actively acquire
knowledge for the purpose of changing the way they vote, the policies
they support, and the demands they make.66 Because of this particular
pattern of truthseeking, the “free flow of information to the public” will
“insure nothing less than democratic decisionmaking,”67 making possible
“remedial action in the conduct of public business” 68 and “unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes
desired by the people.”69
Crucially, the Court’s assumed audience wants this watchdog information
universally—and is willing and able to accept and act upon bad news
about its initially preferred candidate. Even if the citizens once supported
the government official, they will want a continued flow of accurate and
useful information about him or her, whether positive or negative. The
cases speak of press consumers needing “full information in respect of the

60

Estes, 381 U.S. at 539.
Id.; see also Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964) (referencing “the paramount
public interest in a free flow of information to the people concerning public officials”).
62
Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 86.
63
Mills, 384 U.S. at 219.
64
Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 585.
65
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269 (quoting Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931)).
66
Cohn, 420 U.S. at 492 (“Without the information provided by the press most of us and
many of our representatives would be unable to vote intelligently . . . .”); Sullivan, 376
U.S. at 273: (describing people using the press for “effective criticism”); Branzburg, 408
U.S. at 729 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (stating the free press should serve “to insure nothing
less than democratic decisionmaking through the free flow of information to the
public.”).
67
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 729 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
68
Houchins, 438 U.S. at 8.
69
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)).
61
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doings or misdoings of their government”70 and information needed “to
applaud or to criticize”71 government performance.
The Court sees the press audience member as someone who hopes not
merely to have information with which she already agrees or that would
make her comfortable about past choices.72 The Court characterizes
audiences as willingly reading about or viewing some matters that are
unpleasant to or unpopular with those audiences or that express views with
which those audiences might disagree. The assumption is that desired
information will include news of “political conduct and views which some
respectable people approve, and others condemn,”73 and that the audience
will want “unpopular views on public affairs.”74 The Court envisions
citizens seeking completeness of information and sources of truth,
whatever their predispositions or partisan priors. It imagines informed
democratic citizens who are accountability-seeking and will actively
assess the work of government and hold it responsible for necessary
change.
All told, the United States Supreme Court characterizes audiences of the
press as active, focused fact-seekers on a range of hard, important topics.
It unreservedly embraces The Truthseeking Assumption.
2. The Rational-Processing Assumption
The Supreme Court’s press-freedom jurisprudence not only envisions an
audience that seeks after factual truth; it also envisions one that is made up
of people who rationally process that information when it is provided to
them. The assumption is of a press audience member who has the capacity
to competently digest information in deliberative, analytical ways that lead
her to a working understanding of objective facts. The Court is assuming a
citizen reader with sufficient devotion, mental energy, and cognitive
resources to tussle with and to process competing threads of information.
The Court’s repeatedly suggests that readers and listeners are utilizing
their processing skills to achieve “understanding,” “comprehension,” 75
and even “enlightenment” on the issues. Indeed, the Court often speaks of

70

Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 247 (emphasis added).
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 304 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (quoting Barr v.
Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959) (Black, J., concurring)) (describing a desire for coverage
that goes beyond being “a captive mouthpiece of newsmakers”)
72
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 729 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
73
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 272 (1964).
74
Id. at 294 (Black, J., concurring).
75
Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 573 (noting the press is central to “public
understanding of the rule of law and to comprehension of the functioning of the entire
criminal justice system”); Nebraska Press Ass’n, 427 U.S. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring)
(same).
71
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press audience members’ capacity to exercise “enlightened choice,”76 and
to become an “enlightened citizenry,” 77 acting on “an informed and
enlightened public opinion.”
This enlightened press audience found in the jurisprudence is capable of
“intelligently form[ing] opinions”78 and developing “informed and
critical” judgments.79 More fundamentally, the press-freedom
jurisprudence, like the First Amendment itself, “presupposes that right
conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of
tongues.”80 The presumption is that some conclusions will be objectively
right and that press audiences, armed with both mental capacity and
mental energy, will use new information to generate thoughtful opinions
and reach correct conclusions.
The Court’s assumed press audience possesses judgment, logic, and the
reasoning skills to take in information, mull it over, work with it, and
process it logically. The Court’s depiction information consumers is
punctuated by decidedly active cognitive verbs: the audience members are
“canvassing,”81 “examining,”82 and “criticizing.”83 They are “bringing
critical judgment to bear on public affairs.”84 Thus, press freedom is
rooted in a belief in “the triumphs which have been gained by reason and
humanity over error and oppression”85 and “in the power of reason as
applied through public discussion.”86
The Court’s assumed audience will also take the time to engage the facts
and ideas presented—getting to work on wrestling with the material and

76

Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“Enlightened choice by an
informed citizenry is the basic ideal upon which an open society is premised . . . .”).
77
Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. at 728 (Stewart, J., concurring) (arguing that the press
needed a wide swath of protection for its work because “the only effective restraint upon
executive policy and power in the areas of national defense and international affairs may
lie in an enlightened citizenry”).
78
Houchins, 438 U.S. at 8.
79
Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. at 728 (Stewart, J. concurring).
80
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270 (quoting United States v. Assoc. Press, 52 F. Supp. 362
(S.D.N.Y. 1943)).
81
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 275 (1964) (“[T]he press has exerted a freedom in canvassing the
merits and measures of public men, of every description . . . .”)
82
Id. at 274 (“[T]he right of freely examining public characters and measures, and of free
communication among the people thereon . . . .”).
83
Shepherd v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966) (describing how press “guards against
the miscarriage of justice by subjecting” the judicial process to “public scrutiny and
criticism.”).
84
FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 382 (1984).
85
Near, 283 U.S. at 783.
86
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270 (stating that the founders “believe[d] in the power of reason
as applied through public discussion”) (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,
375–76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); see also Tornillo, 418 U.S at 259 (White, J.,
concurring) (same).
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honing it through discussion87 and debate.88 Government regulation of the
press must be resisted precisely because it risks “impoverish[ing]” the
rich, complex “public dialogue” the Court envisions.89
Moreover, this envisioned press audience does not stop at talk. The
Supreme Court’s consumer of press coverage has the cognitive
wherewithal to turn knowledge into working knowledge and to turn
working knowledge into thoughtful, contemplative action. Audience
members are said to employ information to perform plainly deliberative
tasks—to “vote intelligently,” 90 to “enhance the integrity” of
proceedings,91 to “clamor for change,”92 to “resolve issues,”93 to “propose
remedies,”94 to “cope with the exigencies”95 of the day, and, as discussed
in more detail below, to “hold accountable” those in power.
Unquestionably, then, the U.S. Supreme Court assumes that individual
information consumers in the marketplace of ideas are engaging their
cognitive faculties to process the information they take in. They can weigh
87

See, e.g., Mills, 384 U.S. at 218 (“[T]here is practically universal agreement that a
major purpose of [the First] Amendment was to protect the free discussion of
governmental affairs.”); Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 259 (“[F]ree discussion of governmental
affairs.”); Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. at 720 (Black, J., concurring) (suggesting we have
a “free press” “in order to maintain the opportunity for free political discussion”);
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 281 (“It is of the utmost consequence that the people should discuss
the character and qualifications of candidates for their suffrages.”) (quoting Coleman v.
MacLennon, 98 P. 281 (Kan. 1908)); id. at 264 (describing the “maintenance of the
opportunity for free political discussion”).
88
Near, 283 U.S. at 718-19 (emphasizing that public officers[’] character and conduct
remain open to debate and free discussion in the press).
89
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 733 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“Thus, we cannot escape the
conclusion that when neither the reporter nor his source can rely on the shield of
confidentiality against unrestrained use of the grand jury's subpoena power, valuable
information will not be published and the public dialogue will inevitably be
impoverished.”).
90
Cohn, 420 U.S. at 492 (“[T]o vote intelligently or to register opinions on the
administration of government generally.”); see also Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 280–81
(“[W]here an article is published and circulated among voters for the sole purpose of
giving what the defendant believes to be truthful information concerning a candidate for
public office and for the purpose of enabling such voters to cast their ballot more
intelligently . . . .”) (quoting Coleman v. MacLennon, 98 P. 281 (Kan. 1908)).
91
Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 578 (Media . . . presence has historically been
thought to enhance the integrity and quality of what takes place [in the trial courtroom].”)
(footnote omitted).
92
See Mills, 384 U.S. at 219 (“Suppression of the right of the press to praise or criticize
governmental agents and to clamor and contend for or against change . . . muzzles one of
the very agencies the Framers of our Constitution thoughtfully and deliberately selected
to improve our society and keep it free.”)
93
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 738 (“One main function of the First Amendment is to ensure
ample opportunity for the people to determine and resolve public issues.”) (quoting
WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE 41 (1958)).
94
Id. at 269 (noting that “that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely
supposed grievances and proposed remedies . . . .”) (quoting Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375–76
(Brandeis, J., concurring)).
95
See, e.g., Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 102 (noting that press freedom is necessary to “enable
the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period.”)
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values, compare competing data, and deal with volumes of sometimes
complex and often contradictory information. They can be trusted to reach
correct conclusions.
3. The Updating Assumption
Finally, the Supreme Court’s press freedom jurisprudence anticipates a
press audience that is capable of updating information. The cases
repeatedly make clear that the Court assumes that the press audience
member will challenge her previous views and will update her knowledge,
opinions, and beliefs when provided with contrary information.
The assumed press audience consists of people who are not only willing to
accept but regularly affirmatively demand counterspeech 96 —additional
information that questions or refutes news coverage that was previously
received. Most press-freedom cases have the unspoken thesis that this
counterspeech is anticipated, expected, and welcomed by individual
information consumers.97 The Court’s depictions often include references
to a desire to have “the fullest flow of information” 98 and not to be
“fettered”99 by outdated or incorrect communications.
Beyond this, the Court assumes that as the press audience member
receives this continued flow of full, unfettered information, she will use it
to test, modify, or improve her previously held views that are inconsistent
with the newer data. The prototypical press audience member is, the Court
tells us, “scrutinizing”100 facts, people, and situations in order to hone
opinions and revise assessments.
Indeed, the press-freedom cases take as a given not only that audiences
will be craving coverage that “contradict[s],” 101 “counteract[s],” 102
“correct[s],”103 or “rebut[s]”104 preexisting information, but also that this
new information will fix previous thinking by audiences, who will rework
their understanding of the particular matters.

96

See RonNell Andersen Jones, The Press and the Expectation of Executive
Counterspeech, 83 MO. L. REV. 939, 942–43 (2019).
97
Id. at 942.
98
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 738 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
99
Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 250 (noting that “to allow [a free press] to be fettered is to fetter
ourselves”).
100
See, e.g., Cohn, 420 U.S. at 492 (describing the press as “bring[ing] to bear the
beneficial effects of public scrutiny upon the administration of justice.”) (citation
omitted); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966) (describing how press
coverage “guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors,
and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.”).
101
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Butts, 388 U.S. at 143.
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The Court’s press-freedom case law in the libel context particularly
embraces this assumption. The doctrinal structure, which centers on a
threshold distinction between plaintiffs who are private figures and those
who are public ones,105 does so on the assumption that the latter have
greater access to opportunities to offer corrective information to press
audiences than the former.106 It is assumed that this access amounts to
audience exposure and that audience exposure will lead to audience
updating: “The first remedy of any victim of defamation is self-help—
using available opportunities to contradict the lie or correct the error.” 107
Although the Court acknowledges that it can be complicated to unring a
bell,108 the Justices in New York Times v. Sullivan and its progeny are able
to conclude that those with “ready access … to mass media of
communication” can “counter criticism of their views and activities”109 —
and that “sufficient access to the means of counterargument”110 will allow
these individuals to “expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies
of the defamatory statements”111—because they assume an updating
audience: an audience capable of revising its prior views based on the new
information counterargument provides.
The press-freedom model embraced by the Court is that “counterargument
and education are the weapons available to expose” misstatements112—
that “speech can rebut speech, propaganda will answer propaganda, and
free debate of ideas will result in the wisest governmental policies.”113
This model is workable only on the assumption that audience members are
open to receiving replacement information and are capable of executing
that replacing.
B. The Gap Between Supreme Court Assumptions and the Reality of
Press Audiences
The Supreme Court’s core assumptions about press audiences—the
Truthseeking Assumption, the Rational-Processing Assumption, and the
Updating Assumption— are largely undercut by a wide and growing body
of literature in behavioral economics, cognitive psychology, social
psychology about human desires, capacities, and behavior when
interacting with the world of information. Part 1 of this section examines
the ways in which that research makes plain that the Court is operating on
105

Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344.
Id.
107
Id.
108
Id. at n. 9 (“Of course, an opportunity for rebuttal seldom suffices to undo harm of
defamatory falsehood. Indeed, the law of defamation is rooted in our experience that the
truth rarely catches up with a lie.”); Jones, Executive Counterspeech, supra note 96, at
958.
109
Butts, 388 U.S. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring)
110
Id. at 155.
111
Id. (quoting Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
112
Id. (quoting Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 389 (1962)).
113
Butts, 388 U.S. at 153 (quoting Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 503 (1951)).
106

17

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3588625

false premises. Part 2 then considers two additional factors that may be
exacerbating and widening the gap between these Supreme Court
assumptions and on-the-ground reality of press audiences in the current
moment: growing hyperpartisanship, and a changing information
landscape that increasingly enables “filter bubbles” and ideological
segregation in news consumption. On every front, the Court’s thinking
about press audiences is deeply flawed.
1. Social Science Research Demonstrating the Flaws in the
Truthseeking, Rational-Processing, and Updating Assumptions
As described in Part III.A, the Supreme Court often assumes that press
consumers are strongly motivated to seek out facts on important public
matters that will help them have a more accurate view of the world around
them. There is little doubt, of course, that many citizens, in many
circumstances do, in fact, desire, seek out, process, and act upon empirical
truth. However, it turns out that the desire for accurate information is but
one of many motivations—some conscious and many more
subconscious114—that shape and drive the ways that people seek out and
process information. Indeed, research has identified a whole host of other
important and perhaps more dominant motivations that shape informationseeking and processing, including (1) conserving cognitive resources; (2)
expressing and protecting group identity, including cultural and political
identity; and (3) managing threats and uncertainty. These discoveries have
fundamentally reshaped how scientists understand the ways people
interact with information and evaluate the world around them. Taken
together, this research reveals significant flaws in the Court’s
Truthseeking, Rational-Processing, and Updating Assumptions.
a. Conserving Cognitive Resources
Early models of human behavior and decision-making in economics,
sociology, and other fields often treated individuals as “rational actors,”
who use the information available to them to calculate the expected utility
of various options and to make optimal decisions that best satisfy their
own preferences.115 Over time, this “notion of rationality as
optimization”116 was challenged by the idea of “bounded rationality,”
114

For simplicity, we will refer to “motivations” here, although the identified motivations
are perhaps more properly described as factors that influence and shape decisionmaking
processes. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Foreword: Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition,
and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. LAW REV. 1, 19 (2011).
115
Gerd Gigerenzer & Reinhard Selten, Rethinking Rationality 1, 3 in BOUNDED
RATIONALITY: THE ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX (Gerd Gigerenzer & Reinhard Selten, eds.2002);
Thomas Vilovich & Dale Griffin, Introduction—Heuristics and Biases: Then and Now in
HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT (Thomas Gilovich,
Dale Griffin & Daniel Kahneman, eds. 2002) [hereinafter HEURISTICS AND BIASES ] 1, 1.
116
See Gigerenzer & Selten, supra note 115, at 3.
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proposed by Herbert Simon, which suggests that because people have
limited time, information, and cognitive resources (like attention), people
actually make decisions not by optimizing (“calculating utilities and
probabilities”)117 but instead by relying on much simpler rules about when
to stop searching for additional information and how to make ultimate
decisions.118
Building on this insight, in the early 1970s, cognitive psychologist Amos
Tversky and psychologist and economist Daniel Kahneman identified and
described a series of heuristics—mental short-cuts or “rules of
thumb”119—that people employ to make decisions under conditions of
uncertainty. While the heuristics themselves are “sensible estimation
procedures” that “draw on underlying processes. . . that are highly
sophisticated,”120 the resulting judgments are biased—that is, they depart
from “normative rational theory” in predictable ways.121
Of course, people do not always act as “cognitive misers,”122 who hoard
their cognitive resources and limit cognitive expenditures whenever
possible. In later work, Kahneman distinguished between two distinct
modes of decisionmaking, which he termed System 1 and System 2.
System 1 “operates automatically and quickly, with little or no effort and
no sense of voluntary control,” whereas System 2 “allocates attention to
the effortful mental activities that demand it, including complex
computations.”123 System 1, then, is the realm of quick, automatic
judgments, where “quick and dirty”124 heuristics hold primary sway.
System 2, in contrast, is slower and more deliberate—the “effortful
system”125 that we “identify [as our] conscious, reasoning self that has
beliefs, makes choices, and decides what to think about and what to
do.”126 System 2 is typically mobilized when we are surprised by events
or data that don’t conform to our normal expectations or by questions for
which System 1 doesn’t yield a quick answer.127 We also use System 2 to
“monitor” our “own behavior”128 and to exert self-control over the
117

Id. at 8.
Id. at 8 (noting that there are “three classes of processes that models of bounded
rationality typically specify: “[s]imple search rules,”(how to search) “[s]imple stopping
rules,” (when to stop searching) and “[s]imple decision rules” (how to decide)).
119
DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 7 (2011).
120
Gilovich & Griffin, supra note 115, at 3.
121
Id. at 2-3.
122
The term “cognitive misers” was coined by Professors Susan Fiske & Shelley Taylor
to convey the notion that “people are limited in their capacity to process information, so
they take shortcuts whenever they can.” SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL
COGNITION 11-12 (1984).
123
KAHNEMAN, supra note 119, at 20-21.
124
Id. at 25.
125
Id. at 29.
126
Id. at 21.
127
Id. at 24.
128
Id. at 24.
118
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“impulses” generated by System 1.129 Other researchers have articulated
similar “‘dual process theories’ of thinking, knowing, and information
processing.”130
This “division of labor”131 between Systems 1 and 2, with System 1 doing
the bulk of decision-making, works because heuristics typically work—or
at least work well enough for the majority of situations and decisions. The
use of heuristics is both adaptive and, in many respects, fully rational
given limited time, energy, information, and cognitive resources.132
Heuristics do, however, result in predictable biases and systemic errors in
information processing. The following discussion considers several
heuristics and biases that have particularly important consequences for
individual’s interest in and capacity to process information on matters
critical to public policy and government affairs.
i.

The Availability Heuristic

When people make a judgment about how likely a particular risk is to
come to fruition—and thus about how important and serious a particular
societal problem is—they tend to base that judgment on how easily they
can call to mind instances of that problem occurring.133 Thus, those
judgments may turn less on how often that risk has actually come to pass
and more on how “available” or mentally accessible examples of that risk
occurring are; availability, in turn, is influenced by how salient, vivid, and
recent (and thus how memorable) those instances are,134 which in turn may
be influenced by media coverage and public discussion of those events.135
Indeed, Cass Sunstein and Timur Kuran have also suggested that the
“availability errors” generated by this heuristic can be transmitted quickly
and compounded through an “availability cascade”—a “self-reinforcing
process of collective belief formation by which an expressed perception
triggers a chain reaction that gives the perception increasing plausibility
through its rising availability in public discourse.”136
The availability heuristic may help explain why, for example, parents tend
to overestimate the risk of stranger kidnappings. It also helps explain, in
part, why people who have very divergent media consumption patterns
may develop quite divergent views about how likely or important
particular problems are, if those problems are covered with differing
frequency, attention, or vividness in their preferred media streams.
129

Id. at 26.
Paul Slovic et al., The Affect Heuristic, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 115, at
397, 398.
131
KAHNEMAN, supra note 119, at 25.
132
See, e.g. Gigerenzer & Selten, supra at 9.
133
See, e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 122, at 1124.
134
See id. at 1124-25.
135
See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51
STANFORD L. REV. 683, 683 (1998).
136
See id.
130
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ii.

The Affect Heuristic

While there are many different accounts of the role of emotion in decisionmaking, one influential account is the “affect heuristic.” Affect describes a
feeling, whether conscious or subconscious, that something is good or
bad.137 Particularly when System 1 is generating decisions,138 those
feelings can then influence judgments and decisionmaking.139 In
particular, research suggests that people are inclined to judge an activity as
low-risk and high-benefit if they like that activity, and conversely as highrisk and low-benefit if they dislike that activity.140 Similarly, those risks
that evoke a feeling of dread (such as cancer) are perceived as more
serious than those that do not.141
iii.

Loss Aversion and Framing Effects

Tvserky and Kahneman’s Nobel-Prize-winning prospect theory
demonstrates that people tend to care more about losses than equivalent
gains—that is, the disutility associated with a particular loss exceeds the
utility associated with an equivalent gain.142 This “loss aversion” drives a
number of observed heuristics, including “status quo bias”—a “preference
for the current state” of things.143
Moreover, cognitive psychology and behavioral economics research also
demonstrates that differences in the way a question is framed can have
significant effects on our judgments. The combination of framing effects
and loss aversion means that the amount of money people are willing to
spend to address a particular risk turns, to some extent, on whether the
pay-off is presented through a positive or negative frame (e.g., lives saved
v. lives lost).144 People are generally willing to spend more to reduce
fatalities when the issue is framed as preventing deaths rather than saving

137

Slovic et al., supra note 130, at 397, 397.
Because “[a]ffective responses occur rapidly and automatically,” they are often
viewed as part of System 1 (or experiential) thinking. Id. at 398.
139
Id. at 400.
140
Id. at 410-12.
141
Id. at 410. Closely related to the affect heuristic is George Loewenstein’s “risk-asfeelings hypothesis,” which suggests that when “emotional reactions to risky situations . .
. diverge” from “cognitive assessments,” “emotional reactions often drive behavior.”
George F. Loewenstein et al., Risk as Feelings, 127 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN 267, 267
(2001).
142
See id.
143
Daniel Kahneman et al., The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias,
5 J. OF ECON. PERSPECTIVES 193, 193 (1991). It also explains the “endowment effect,” in
which people “demand[] much more to give up an object than they would be willing to
pay to acquire” it. Id.
144
See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the
Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453, 453 (1981).
138
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livings.145 More generally, whether an issue is framed in terms of negative
or positive impacts can affect the kind of solutions that seem appealing
and appropriate.146
*

*

*

All told, the behavioral research on conserving cognitive resources casts
doubt on the Court’s assumptions that American press audiences actively
seek out truth, rationally process facts, and readily update mistaken
assumptions. Our bounded rationality limits both our capacity and desire
to seek out and filter the seemingly boundless information available on
every policy issue. The desire to conserve cognitive resources and avoid
information overload limits a press audience member’s motivation to seek
out and process empirical facts. Indeed, doing so may be a quite rational
response in many circumstances. Moreover, reliance on simple heuristics
to conserve mental resources, while rational and useful in a wide variety
of circumstances, also affects press audience’s processing of the
information they do receive. These heuristics result in systemic bias that
causes press audience members to, for example, judge the importance of
problems based on whether they can conjure up vivid, salient examples of
that risk, to base their assessment of the costs and benefits of an activity
on how much they like that activity, and to be biased toward the status quo
and against taking measures that risk losses.
One might conclude from the preceding discussion that problems with
human cognition can be mitigated, at least in some instances, by
encouraging people to actively engage System 2, deliberative thinking
when evaluating evidence about significant societal problems. And,
indeed, research suggests that when accuracy-motivations come to the
forefront, people “expend more cognitive effort on issue-related reasoning,
attend to relevant information more carefully, and process it more deeply,
often using more complex rules.”147 Conserving cognitive resources is not,
however, the only motivation that competes with accuracy-seeking.148
b. Expressing and Protecting Cultural and Political Identity

145

See id.
See Lisa Grow Sun & Brigham Daniels, Mirrored Externalities, 90 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 135, 135 (2014) (arguing that whether externalities—such as the third-party effects
of vaccination—are framed in positive or negative terms can have “profound effects on
both the way we think about and process externalities and on our politics and policy
development”).
147
Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN 480,
481 (1990).
148
See, e.g., Hart et al., Feeling Validated Versus Being Correct: A Meta-Analysis of
Selective Exposure to Information, 135 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN 555 (2009)
(describing the competition between the accuracy goal and the goal of defending one’s
preexisting views and noting that “information choices are meant to fulfill goals to
defend attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors and to accurately appraise and represent reality”).
146
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Even when we engage our deliberative faculties, truth isn’t always the
primary objective we pursue. Empirical evidence suggests that people
often engage in “motivated reasoning”: “the unconscious tendency . . . to
process information in a manner that suits some end or goal extrinsic to
the formation of accurate beliefs.”149 Often, motivated reasoning involves
seeking out or processing new data in ways that conform to one’s
preexisting beliefs150 (so-called “confirmation bias”).151 While motivated
reasoning can influence System 1 thinking, its influence on System 2
thinking may be at least as profound.152 Indeed, engaging in motivated
reasoning is often thought to require the expenditure of cognitive
resources: cognitive resources must be marshaled to counter-argue or
otherwise justify dismissal or discounting of information contrary to our
desired result153 (so-called “disconfirmation bias”).154
Recent research suggests that one of the primary goals of motivated
reasoning is the expression and protection of group identity—such as
one’s cultural or political identity. Thus, one prominent manifestation of
motivated reasoning is cultural cognition, which “refers to the tendency of
individuals to conform their beliefs about disputed matters of fact . . . to
values that define their cultural identities.”155 Studies of a host of

149

Kahan, supra note 114, at 19 (2011).
See, e.g., Brendan Nyhan & Jason Reifler, When Corrections Fail, 32 POLITICAL
BEHAVIOR 303, 307 (2010) (observing that “people tend to display bias in evaluating
political arguments and evidence, favoring those that reinforce their exiting views and
disparaging those that contradict their views”); C.S. Taber & M. Lodge, Motivated
Skepticism in the Evaluation of Political Beliefs, 50 AM. J. POLITICAL SCIENCE 755, 756
(2006) (noting that “tension between the drives for accuracy and belief perseverance
underlies all human reasoning” as people seek to accommodate competing “accuracy
goals” and “partisan goals, which motivate them to apply their reasoning powers in
defense of a prior, specific conclusion”).
151
Toby Bolsen et al., The Influence of Partisan Motivated Reasoning on Public Opinion,
36 POLIT. BEHAV. 235, 237 (2014).
152
See Kahan, supra note 114, at 21 (“Indeed, far from being immune from identityprotective cognition, individuals who display a greater disposition to use reflective and
deliberative (so-called System 2) forms of reasoning rather than intuitive, affective ones
(System 1) can be expected to be even more adept at using technical information and
complex analysis to bolster group-congenial beliefs.”).
153
See, e.g., Brian F. Schaffner & Cameron Roche, Misinformation and Motivated
Reasoning: Responses to Economic News in a Politicized Environment, 81 PUBLIC
OPINION QUARTERLY 86, 88 (2016) (“Motivated reasoning is a process in which an
individual makes an active, cognitive effort to ‘arrive at a particular conclusion’”)
(quoting Kunda, supra note 147).
154
Bolsen, supra note 151, at 237.
155
The Cultural Cognition Project, http://www.culturalcognition.net/, last visited March
18, 2019. More specifically, cultural cognition theory maps people’s worldviews along
two axes: “hierarchy-egalitarianism” and “individualism-communitarianism,” Kahan et
al., Cultural Cognition of Scientific Consensus, 14 J. OF RISK RESEARCH 147, 151 (2011),
and posits that an array of psychological mechanisms (including motivated reasoning and
the availability and affect heuristics) will cause people’s assessments of risks to align
with their worldviews. Id. at 148.
150
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controversial and disputed social issues—including climate change,156
nanotechnology,157 HPV vaccination,158 the death penalty,159 nuclear
power,160 and gun control161—suggest that individuals, often
unconsciously, “selectively . . . credit or dismiss evidence of risk” based
on cultural values.162 The result is quite divergent (sometimes
“diametrically opposed”) risk perceptions across cultural divides.163
Interestingly, expertise, education, and increased scientific literacy and
numeracy can amplify rather than diminish this polarization, perhaps
because expertise and education may simply be additional cognitive
resources that can be mobilized to serve the goals of motivated
reasoning.164
Recent research likewise suggests that protecting one’s political identity is
another important motivation that influences the way that people seek out
and process information. A study of motivated reasoning in the context of
mathematical reasoning found that Republicans were more likely to
correctly answer a math-story problem about the effect of a handgun ban
on crime when the correct answer aligned with their presumed political
priors—that gun control measures increase, rather than decrease crime—
whereas Democrats were more likely to answer correctly when the data
showed that the handgun ban decreased crime.165 This “motivated
numeracy effect” was stronger among high-numeracy individuals (those
with greater mathematical skills) than among low-numeracy
individuals.166

156

See, e.g., Daniel M. Kahan et al., Cultural and Identity-Protective Cognition:
Explaining the White Male Effect in Risk Perception, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES,
465 (2007).
157
See, e.g., Daniel M. Kahan et al., Cultural Cognition of the Risks and Benefits of
Nanotechnology, 4 NATURE NANOTECH 87 (2009).
158
Daniel M. Kahan et al., Who Fears the HPV Vaccine, Who Doesn’t, and Why? An
Experimental Study of the Mechanisms of Cultural Cognition, 34 LAW & HUMAN
BEHAVIOR 501 (2010).
159
Charles G. Lord, Lee Ross & Mark R. Lepper, Biased Assimilation and Attitude
Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J.
of Personality & Social Psychology 2098 (1979).
160
See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 156.
161
See, e.g., id.
162
Kahan, supra note 155, at 148.
163
Id. at 149.
164
See, e.g., Daniel M. Kahan et al, The Polarizing Impact of Science Literacy and
Numeracy on Perceived Climate Change Risks, 2 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 732 (2012)
(finding that “cultural polarization” over climate change facts was most pronounced
among those “with the highest degrees of science literacy,” suggesting that “public
divisions over climate change” result from cultural commitments rather than lack of
scientific understanding); Daniel Kahan et al., Motivated Numeracy and Enlightened SelfGovernment, 1 BEHAVIOURAL PUBLIC POLICY 54, 76 (2017); see also Daniel Kahan,
Motivated System 2 Reasoning (MS2R): A Research Program,
http://www.culturalcognition.net/motivated-system-2-reasoning-m/?SSScrollPosition=0.
165
Kahan et al., supra note 164, at 68-69.
166
See id. at 75.
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Underlying motivations for these forms of “identity-protective
cognition”167 might include minimizing cognitive dissonance that might
result from crediting facts that challenge one’s worldview,168 “protecti[ng]
social standing” in one’s cultural group,169 and expressing support for that
group and its members.170 Whatever the precise reason, it seems clear that
people are often motivated to seek out and process information in ways
that express, affirm, and protect their preexisting political and cultural
identities.
Moreover, motivated reasoning results not just in “biased assimilation”171
of facts, but also in “biased search”172 or “selective exposure.”173 That is,
people engaged in identity-protective cognition are not seeking out what is
“true,” but rather are seeking out information that confirms, rather than
challenges, their existing beliefs, and worldviews.174 Research on media
consumption preferences and habits demonstrates that party affiliation and
political preferences do, indeed, drive media choices.175 One study of 2004
data found, for example, that a “substantial proportion of the public . .
consumes media sharing their political predispositions.176

167

Id.
Id. at 149; Dustin Carnahan et al., Candidate Vulnerability and Exposure to
Counterattitudinal Information: Evidence from Two U.S. Presidential Elections, HUMAN
COMMUNICATIONS RESEARCH 1, 10 (2016) (noting that “dissonance theory remains the
preeminent explanation of selective exposure”).
169
Id.
170
See, e.g., Schaffner & Roche, supra note 153, at 87-88 (describing the potential for
“expressive responding” as an aspect of motivated reasoning).
171
Kahan, supra note 114, at 21.
172
Id.
173
R. Kelly Garrett & Natalie Jomini Stroud, Partisan Paths to Exposure Diversity:
Differences in Pro-and Counterattitudinal News Consumption, 64 J. OF
COMMUNICATIONS 680, 680 (2014).
174
Researchers have hypothesized a number of potential explanations for biased search,
including managing cognitive dissonance from encountering information contrary to
one’s existing views, conserving cognitive resources (because processing information
that conflicts with one’s beliefs may be “cognitively taxing”), and judging proattitudinal
information as “higher quality” or more trustworthy than counterattitudinal information.
Garrett & Stroud, supra note 173, at 681-82. Some researchers contend that “biased
search” actually reflects two distinct phenomena: “selective approach” (seeking out
proattitudinal information) and “selective avoidance” (actively avoiding
counterattitudinal information), while other researchers treat selective approach and
selective avoidance as two sides of the same coin. Id. at 681.
175
Natalie Jomini Stroud, Media Use and Political Predispositions: Revisiting the
Concept of Selective Exposure, 30 POLITICAL BEHAVIOR 341 (2008) (concluding that
“people’s political predispositions are important determinants of their media use”)
(emphasis omitted).
176
Id. More specifically, “64 percent of conservative Republicans consume[d] at least
one conservative media outlet compared to 26 percent of liberal Democrats,” whereas
“43 percent of conservative Republicans consume[d] at least one liberal outlet while 74
percent of liberal Democrats consume[d] at least one liberal outlet.” Id. “Conservative
Republicans are more likely to read newspapers endorsing Bush, listen to conservative
talk radio, watch FOX, and access conservative websites. Liberal Democrats are more
likely to read newspapers endorsing Kerry, listen to liberal radio, watch CNN/MSNBC,
168
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Recent data confirm these partisan divides in media preferences. A 2014
Pew Research study found that “[w]hen it comes to getting news about
government and politics, there are stark ideological differences in the
sources that online Americans use, as well as in their awareness of and
trust in these sources.”177 Nearly half of conservatives identify Fox News
“as their main source for news about government and politics.” 178
Although there is no dominant media outlet identified by liberals, “liberals
are more than twice as likely as web-using adults overall to name NPR
(13% vs. 5%), MSNBC (12% VS. 4%), and the New York Times (10% vs.
3%) as their top source for political news.”179
Motivated reasoning may also have particularly significant consequences
for the Court’s assumptions that people will eagerly update their factual
conclusions and beliefs. Indeed, research suggests that people’s views on
factual questions are “sticky”: even when confronted directly with new
information that contradicts their current beliefs, people are reticent to
significantly revise or “update” their view of the facts.180
Reluctance to update has been the focus of significant recent attention,
with widely circulated reports suggesting not only that people don’t update
but that efforts to encourage updating result in a so-called “backfire
effect,” in which their erroneous views become even more entrenched.181
The “backfire effect” quickly became part of the arsenal of those arguing
mostly strenuously that we are now in a Post-Truthism era. If attempts to
correct people’s basic factual misperceptions on questions critical to
public policy are not only sometimes unsuccessful but often actually
counterproductive—causing people to “double down” 182 on mistaken
factual judgments that support their ideological views—then constructive,
deliberate political debate seems a pipedream indeed.
Later research, however, casts doubt on the strength of these findings—
and, in particular, has failed to replicate the backfire effect in other
and access liberal websites.” Id.
177
PEW RESEARCH REPORT, POLITICAL POLARIZATION AND MEDIA HABITS, Oct. 21, 2014,
at 11 https://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2014/10/PoliticalPolarization-and-Media-Habits-FINAL-REPORT-7-27-15.pdf.
178
Id. at 2.
179
Id. at 4. “Among the large group of respondents with mixed ideological views, CNN
(20%) and local TV (16%) are top sources; Fox News (8%), Yahoo News (7%) and
Google News (6%) round out their top five sources.” Id.
180
See, e.g., Schaffner & Roche, supra note 153, at 104 (finding clear evidence of
motivated reasoning in “why individuals provide persistent misinformation” about
politically important questions, like the unemployment rate, under a president they
support or oppose).
181
See Nyhan & Reifler, supra note 150, at 323. Nyhan and Reifler hypothesized that the
“backfire effect” might result from people so “vigorously” generating counterarguments
against the ideologically “unwelcome information” that they not only defend, but actually
“bolster their preexisting views.” Id. at 308.
182
Thomas Wood & Ethan Porter, The Elusive Backfire Effect: Mass Attitudes’ Steadfast
Factual Adherence, POLITICAL BEHAVIOR (forthcoming), available at
http://djflynn.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/elusive-backfire-effect-wood-porter.pdf.
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experimental contexts.183 Nonetheless, a recent collaborative study on the
effect of fact-checking on people’s factual beliefs conducted by the
authors of the original backfire study and their primary critics concluded
that, even in the absence of backfire, there is a “widespread evidence of
motivated reasoning” in the processing and updating of factual beliefs,
citing prior findings that “for approximately 80% of issues tested,
responsiveness to corrective information varied by ideology.” 184
Moreover, the authors noted that while the current study results showed no
evidence of backfire and indicated at least some participant capacity to
update, 185 the study confirmed those earlier findings by documenting
motivated-reasoning effects in the form of “differential acceptance”—in
which the extent of updating depended on people’s political priors (and
thus whether the fact-check was responding to pro- or counter-attitudinal
facts) on some of the tested factual claims.186
Accordingly, while the jury is still out on the precise extent and
mechanisms by which motivated reasoning limits factual updating on
controversial facts with high political salience, the evidence suggests that
we are at least somewhat reluctant to update our preexisting factual views
because we are motivated to protect our cultural and political identities.
Press audiences’ preexisting views on factual questions critical to
important public policy debates are thus likely to be “sticky,” and the most
recent research indicates that while we may not be “fact-immune,” we are
probably quite “fact-resistant.”187
c. Managing Threats and Uncertainty

183

A 2017 study by Professors Thomas Wood and Ethan Porter tested for the backfire
effect with a variety of experimental protocols in a study of more than 10,100 subjects on
fifty-two contentious issues. Thomas Wood & Ethan Porter, The Elusive Backfire Effect:
Mass Attitudes’ Steadfast Factual Adherence, POLITICAL BEHAVIOR (forthcoming),
available at http://djflynn.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/elusive-backfire-effect-woodporter.pdf. Their study, conducted “during the height of the presidential primary” season,
when political loyalties and interest might well be at their zenith, did not identify even “a
single instance of factual backfire.” Id. Moreover, when study participants were
confronted with ideologically unwelcome factual correction, most did, in fact, update
their factual beliefs: “for about nine issues in ten, factual information significantly
improves the average respondent’s accuracy. At least for a brief moment, their perceptual
screens dim, and the facts prevail.” Id.
184
Brendan Nyhan et al., Taking Fact-Checks Literally But Not Seriously? The Effects of
Journalist Fact-checking on Factual Beliefs and Candidate Favorability, POLITICAL
BEHAVIOR (forthcoming) 1, available at https://www.dartmouth.edu/~nyhan/trumpcorrections.pdf (citing Wood & Porter, supra note 183).
185
Fact-checking caused study-participants, regardless of their political priors, to update
their views to align more fully with the facts, even when those facts ran counter to their
political ideology and affiliation. See id. at 4.
186
Id. at 6.
187
Alexios Mantzarlis, Director of the International Fact-Checking Network at The
Poynter Institute, The History of Fake News (Part 2), BBC TRENDING, Jan. 21, 2018,
bbc.co.uk, 9:00-10:00, https://www.bbc.co.uk/sounds/play/w3csvtp9.
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Research also reveals that human information seeking and processing are
not merely driven by a need for accuracy, but motivated by a deep need to
manage threat and uncertainty. Like other fields of social science, social
psychology and, particularly, social cognition, 188 suggest a variety of
factors, beyond simple empirical truth, that shape the ways that people
seek out and interpret data about the social world they inhabit.
As with other cognitive models, the dominant social-cognition models of
the “social thinker” 189 have evolved over time from hypothesizing
“consistency seekers motivated by [reducing] perceived discrepancies
among their cognitions”190 to “naïve scientists” who employ “attribution
theories” to “explain their own and other people’s behavior” 191 to
“cognitive misers” who “take shortcuts” to minimize demands on their
limited cognitive capacities192 to “motivated tacticians” who select and
cycle among various cognitive strategies to suit their needs and desires in
particular contexts,193 to “activated actors” who rely primarily on rapid
“unconscious associations” that “cue associated cognitions.”194 Each of
these models continues, however, to explain important aspects of social
cognition.195
Many of the motivations recognized by social cognition research echo or
mirror those of behavioral economics and cognitive psychology more
generally. For example, the needs for “belonging,” “shared social
understandings,” and “in-group trust”196 might be seen as corollaries of the
desire to protect and express one’s group identity discussed above. Other
motivations, such as the desire to see one’s self positively (“selfenhancement”)197 and to exert control over “outcomes that depend on
other people,”198 are perhaps more prominent in social cognition than in
other fields.

188

Social cognition is a sub-field of social psychology that studies the “mental processes
involved in perceiving, attending to, remembering, thinking about, and making sense of
the people in our social world.” GORDON MOSCOWITZ, SOCIAL COGNITION:
UNDERSTANDING SELF AND OTHERS 3 (2005).
189
FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 122, at 17.
190
Id. at 13.
191
Id. at 14.
192
Id. at 15.
193
Id. at 16.
194
Id.
195
Moreover, like cognitive psychology, much of social psychology utilizes a dualprocess model with an “automatic” and a “deliberate” mode of cognition, id. at 33,
although the model acknowledges more of a “continuum” with various gradations, id. at
55.
196
Id. at 51-54. “Belonging” involves “[b]eing accepted by other people [or] one’s group,”
understanding or “social shared cognition” involves the “believe that one’s views
correspond to those of one’s group,” and in-group trust involves “viewing people, at least
in one’s own group, positively.” Id. at 52.
197
Id. at 54.
198
Id. at 52-53.
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Several theories in social cognition suggest that managing threats199—to
one’s life, way of life, and the status quo—is likewise an important
motivation that influences cognition. For example, “mortality salience,” a
focus on one’s own death “makes people cherish worldview that will
outlive them.”200 In other words, people who feel threatened “validate the
ideologies of their salient group identities. Under threat, conservatives
want to conserve, and progressives want to progress,”201 and both groups
incline to “strong leaders, who reduce apparent uncertainty.”202 Similarly,
terror management theory posits that people cope with salient reminders of
their own mortality “by identifying with their ingroups, which will outlive
them,”203 and striking out against outgroups.204
Another potential method for managing uncertainty is engaging in
essentialist thinking about the “other,” because doing so helps people feel
more confident in their ability to predict events and to understand others’
behavior. This tendency is exemplified by the “fundamental attribution
error,” the “most commonly documented bias in social perception,”205 in
which people ascribe others’ behavior or circumstances to their fixed
traits, rather than acknowledging the role that “situational forces” play in
shaping that person’s behavior and life circumstances. 206 Thus, if
something terrible happens to someone in an outgroup, we tend to assume
it is because they are a “bad” person rather than because they are in a bad
situation, whereas we tend to assume the opposite when bad things happen
to ourselves or to people with whom we easily relate. We thus tend to be
far less charitable in our assessments of people who are not like us.
A more controversial theory, known as system justification theory,
suggests that both advantaged and disadvantaged groups are inclined to
“legitimate the status quo,”207 particularly when the system is threatened
or attacked.208 System justification is not always activated, but when it is,
people are inclined to “more favorable attitudes toward the system than”
the evidence supports 209 and may further these attitudes by engaging
strategies like rationalization and victim-blaming.210 System justification
199

Id. at 311 (defining “threats” as intense uncertainty about an important negative
possibility”).
200
Id. at 311.
201
Id.
202
Id.
203
Id.
204
See id. Under some circumstances, “[i]ntense ingroup identification, coupled with
perceived threat” to “cherished values” can make people on the right incline to
authoritarianism. Id. at 310; see also id. (noting that “the left wing does not test as
authoritarian per se, although both left and right can be dogmatic”).
205
FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 122, at 179.
206
Id. at 181.
207
Id. at 312.
208
Jaime L. Napier et al., System Justification in Responding to the Poor and Displaced
in the Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, 6 ANALYSES OF SOCIAL ISSUES & PUBLIC POLICY,
57, 61 (2006).
209
Id. at 60.
210
Id. at 60.
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can serve “multiple needs, including epistemic and existential needs to
manage uncertainty and threat,” promote “order, structure, and closure,”
and decrease “emotional distress associated with social inequality.”211
All together, this body of literature suggests strongly that motives like
managing uncertainty and threat compete heavily with accuracy
motivations in human information seeking and information processing.
***
The social science evidence suggests that the Supreme Court’s
Truthseeking, Rational-Processing, and Updating Assumptions are deeply
flawed. The empirical evidence makes clear that people have a wide
variety of motivations other than truthseeking, including preserving
cognitive resources, expressing and protecting cultural and political
identity, and managing threats and uncertainty.
Moreover, whether engaging the rapid, automatic decisionmaking
associated with System 1 or the slower, more deliberate decisionmaking
that characterizes System 2 reasoning, people often process information in
biased ways. Most strikingly, motivated reasoning—often designed to
protect one’s cultural or political identity—means that press audiences
will tend to process information in ways that confirm their preexisting
views and that otherwise conform to their cultural commitments or
political priors.
Likewise, people face significant barriers to rationally updating their prior
beliefs. The same phenomena that hamstring a press audience in seeking
and processing truth—bounded rationality, motivating reasoning, and
identity-protective cognition—all suggest that once press audience
members have processed information about matters of public concern and
come to a conclusion about what the underlying facts are, those factual
judgments will be difficult to dislodge
2. Current Exacerbating Factors
Cognitive limitations have always had implications for theories of
democracy, 212 the First Amendment, 213 and transparency. 214 Likewise,
211

Id. at 60.
See, e.g., Ilya Somin, Voter Ignorance and the Democratic Ideal, 12 CRITICAL REV.
413, 417 (1998).
213
See, e.g., See, e.g., Lidsky, supra note 24, at 800 (arguing that the “rational audience
model represents a flawed but worthy ideal” in the free speech context); Lyrissa Barnett
Lidsky & Thomas F. Cotter, Authorship, Audiences & Anonymous Speech, 82 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1537, 1581-82 (2007) (noting that the assumption “that audiences are
capable of rationally assessing the truth, quality, and other characteristics of core
speech,” while debatable, is “unlikely to be displaced from the pantheon of general First
Amendment principles anytime soon”); Bambauer, supra note 24, at 651 (arguing that
212
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citizens have often lacked basic factual knowledge about current affairs
and thus used cues like political affiliation to decide which candidates and
policies to support. 215 But these longstanding truths about cognitive
limitations and mental shortcuts seem to be exacerbated today by
additional factors that are arguably unique to this particular Post-Truthism
moment. New research from the fields of political science and
communications highlights the concrete ways in which our cognitive
limitations and biases are being amplified by the confluence of two
sweeping and mutually-reinforcing societal phenomena: hyperpartisanship and the shifting information landscape. These factors further
widen the gap between Supreme Court assumption and on-the-ground
reality.
a. Hyperpartisanship
Partisanship is, of course, nothing new. Nonetheless, levels of partisanship
are on the rise and significantly higher than in the recent past. In 2014, the
Director of Political Research at the Pew Research Center declared,
“Political polarization is the defining feature of early 21st century
American politics, both among the public and elected officials.”216 This
pronouncement was grounded in a 2014 Pew Research report that found
“Republicans and Democrats are more divided along ideological lines—
and partisan antipathy is deeper and more extensive—than at any point in
the last two decades.”217 The area of policy agreement between Democrats
and Republicans has shrunk considerably over those decades, as
Republicans have shifted to the right and Democrats have shifted to the
left. This polarization means that, as of 2014, “92% of Republicans are to
the right of the median (middle) Democrat, compared with 64%” in 1994,
and “94% of Democrats are to the left of the median Republican,”
compared with 70% in 1994.218 The same deepening polarization is also
“research in cognitive psychology and behavioral economics shows that humans operate
with significant, persistent perceptual biases that skew our interactions with information,”
that “[t]hese biases undercut the assumption that people reliably sift data to find truth,
and that the U.S. should thus “discard the marketplace of ideas as our framework for
evaluating communications regulation”).
214
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215
See, e.g., Michael S. Kang, Democratizing Direct Democracy: Restoring Voter
Competence Through Heuristic Cues and “Disclosure Plus,” 50 UCLA LAW REV. 1141,
1164-65 (2003) (endorsing ordinary citizens’ use of heuristics—like party affiliation and
the views of political elites—as a rational tool for determining how to vote: “heuristic
cues are an informational bargain, providing relatively high returns at low cost to voters
who need help”).
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evident in Congress, which by some metrics is “now more polarized than
at any time since the end of Reconstruction.” 219
As cultural cognition and identity-protective cognition predict,
Republicans and Democrats are divided today not just on policy, but on
facts. Ironically, one of the few things on which Republicans and
Democrats readily agree is that they fundamentally disagree about many
basic facts.220
This perception is borne out by public opinion polls that document a stark
partisan factual divide on an extensive array of important factual issues.
For example, in 2018, three-quarters of those who lean Democrat agreed
that “the Earth is warming primarily due to human causes,” whereas only
about one-quarter of Republicans concurred.221 Similarly, in 2016, nearly
three-quarters of Democrats believed unemployment had decreased during
the Obama administration, but—again—only one-quarter of Republicans
agreed.222 About two-third of Republicans believed Obama had deported
fewer undocumented immigrants than President Bush, “but less than half
of Democrats” agreed.223 In some respects the breadth and depth of these
factual divides should not be surprising: in an increasingly partisan world,
almost every issue is politicized, 224 which activates “motivated
reasoning”—and creates deep partisan divides—on many more factual
issues than would otherwise be the case.
Unfortunately, many Republicans and Democrats today don’t simply
disagree with each other: increasingly, they also disdain, demonize,
219

Drew Desilver, The Polarized Congress of Today Has its Roots In the 1970s, June 12,
2014, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/06/12/polarized-politics-in-congressbegan-in-the-1970s-and-has-been-getting-worse-ever-since/ (quoting Poole and
Rosenthal). Today, the ideological overlap between the two parties has all but
disappeared. In the mid-1970s, 240 representatives “scored in between the most
conservative Democrat . . . and the most liberal Republican,” as did 29 senators. Id.
Those numbers declined to 66 representatives and 10 senators by the mid-1980s and then
to 9 representatives and 3 senators by the mid-1990s. Id. “By 2011-12 there was no
overlap at all in either chamber.” Id.
220
PEW RESEARCH CENTER REPORT, REPUBLICANS AND DEMOCRATS AGREE: THEY
CAN’T AGREE ON BASIC FACTS, Aug. 23, 2018, available at
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/08/23/republicans-and-democrats-agreethey-cant-agree-on-basic-facts/ft_18-08-23_basicfacts_whites-older-americans/
(reporting that 78% of reporters think that Republicans and Democrats “[d]isagree not
only on plans and policies, but also on basic facts”).
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TO PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AS INSUFFICIENT, May 14, 2018, at 3, available at
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L. REV. 2392, 2427 (2014) (arguing that “in today’s politicized environment, everything
is contested”).
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disparage, and even dehumanize each other.225 In 2016, poll data showed
that about half of Republicans and Democrats were “afraid” of the
opposing party. 226 More than one-third of Democrats described
Republicans as more “dishonest,” “immoral,” and “unintelligent” than
other Americans. 227 Conversely, almost half of Republicans described
Democrats as more “immoral,” “dishonest,” and “lazy.”228 A 2017 survey
found that “nearly 20 percent of Democrats and Republicans say that
many members of the other side ‘lack the traits to be considered fully
human,’” and “[e]ven more chilling,” “about 15 percent of Republicans
and 20 percent of Democrats agree that the country would be ‘better off if
large numbers of opposing partisans in the public today ‘just died.’”229
Additionally, a 2018 survey found that “45 percent of Democrats and 35
percent of Republicans” would be “unhappy if their child married
someone from the opposite party (up from about 5 percent for both groups
in 1960). 230 And, indeed, “[s]ince 1973, the rate of politically mixed
marriages in America has declined by 50 percent.”231 That decline, in
turn, may further deepen the partisan divide, as people in politically mixed
marriages—and, importantly, their children—tend to be more politically
moderate.232
For some significant portion of Republicans and Democrats, then, party
affiliation is seen as a reliable enough proxy for humanity in both of the
important senses of that word: are you deserving of dignity and being
treated as fully human (or can I legitimately treat you as fundamentally
other) and are you humane (or can I legitimately view you as lacking basic
decency). Presumably, these two judgments are, at least in some respects,
inextricably linked. And, interestingly, it is “white, urban, older, highly
educated, politically engaged, and politically segregated” Americans who
are mostly likely to answer no to these questions when judging members
of the other political party and to express disdain and contempt for those
on the “other side.” 233 As described above, especially in times of
perceived threat, this “othering” can intensify group identification and
make it easier not only to discount or dismiss opposing views but to justify
225
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retreat into ideological silos that enable people to avoid engaging people
with whom they disagree. Moreover, the affect heuristic and motivated
reasoning both suggest that when people “other” those with whom they
disagree, they will be more inclined to accept misinformation that falsely
suggests that their opponents are unreasonable, malicious, or even
dangerous.234
While it is possible that the partisan factual divides are not as quite
intractable and stark as they appear, 235 deepening partisanship is a factor
that unquestionably undergirds any discussion of modern press-audience
behaviors and exacerbates gaps between those behaviors and the
assumptions of the Court.
b. The Changing Information Landscape
Another reason that press-audience dynamics seem so starkly different—
and that the threat to truth and truthseeking seems so grave—in the present
moment is a fear that the changing information landscape is exacerbating
existing human limitations and pathologies. The explosion of available
information risks “infobesity”236 or information overload that presumably
heightens the need for (and tendency to) resort to shortcuts and heuristics
that conserve cognitive resources, potentially at the expense of accuracy
and truthseeking. Moreover, the advent and exponential growth of social
media as a source of news and forum for political discussion may both
enable and amplify biased search and selective exposure. If these fears
come to fruition, the gap between our media reality and the Court’s
assumptions of press audience willingness to seek out truth that conflicts
with their worldview and preexisting beliefs is likely to widen.
Despite the internet’s multiplication of news sources and facilitation of
easy access to a wide and diverse array of news outlets, many fear that—
rather than diversifying our media diet—we will choose to inhabit online
echo chambers where we surround ourselves with people and information
with which we agree.237 Cass Sunstein, for example, has argued that there
234
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is a growing risk that people’s online lives will be ideologically siloed
because of “people’s growing power to filter what they see” and
“providers’ growing power to filter for each of us, based on what they
know about us.” 238 Individual tendency toward biased search and
selective exposure will likely be magnified by algorithms employed by
social media and other websites designed to keep us on their sites as long
as possible (and thereby maximize revenue) by serving up the kind of
ideologically congruent content it thinks (probably correctly) that we want
to see.
The resulting “filter bubbles,” 239 may augment and entrench selective
exposure among even the best-intended who might want more balanced
information exposure, as so much of that filtering occurs either entirely or
partially unbeknownst to us in service of powerful profit motives. In the
partisan context, this phenomenon is perhaps most vividly captured by the
Wall Street Journal’s Red Feed/Blue Feed project, which juxtaposes a
simulated liberal (“blue”) next to a conservative (“red”) Facebook feed,
highlighting the divergence between red and blue echo chambers on issues
from President Trump to immigration to guns to abortion.240 Viewing the
two feeds, one does indeed wonder if conservatives and liberals are living
in two different Americas, or at least in two different online Americas.
Such “ideological segregation,” 241 driven by potent profit motives
reinforcing and exacerbating our own worst instincts, portends serious
challenges for democratic information flow premised on truth seeking
through exposure to conflicting views.
Empirical research suggests that the direst predictions about social-media
driven echo chambers and filter bubbles have not—or at least have not
yet—come to pass. Thus far, most studies have found that, self-reporting
about media preferences notwithstanding, there is still large overlap
between the news actually viewed by Republicans and Democrats—in
large part because most internet users still get most of their news from a
handful of relatively mainstream media outlets. A large-scale analysis of
online behavioral data242 from 2015 and 2016, including the run-up to the
2016 presidential election, found that the “media diets of Democrats and
Republicans overlap more than they diverge and center around the middle
of the ideological spectrum,” a “pattern . . . largely driven by the
238
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dominance of mainstream, relatively centrist websites—the kinds of
‘general-interest intermediaries’” of media days of yore.243 Moreover, “the
media diets of the vast majority of people—regardless of political
orientation—are moderate, with only a small share of highly partisan
respondents driving a disproportionate amount of traffic to relatively
extreme outlets, especially on the right.”244 Other studies have reached
similar conclusions.245
There are, nonetheless, real reasons to be concerned about whether the
shift to internet news consumption will exacerbate polarization, especially
as social media sites like Facebook increasingly acting as a “front page”
for media outlets,246 as some data does suggest that greater polarization
may occur when people use social media to get their news.247 Increasingly
sophisticated algorithms may also drive more “ideological segregation” 248
in the future.
While both hyperpartisanship and the changing information landscape
have a complex relationship with the cognitive limitations addressed in
Part III.B.1—at times seeming to be caused by those limitations and at
times seeming to amplify them—both of these factors widen the gap
between the Supreme Court’s assumptions about press consumers and
their real-world desires, capacities, and behaviors.
IV.

THEORETICAL RESPONSES
AND REALITY

TO THE

GAP BETWEEN ASSUMPTION

This gap seems to threaten both the marketplace-of-ideas theory of the
press and its concomitant justifications for press protections. Indeed, when
viewed through a narrow lens, there are good reasons to be frustrated with
the marketplace-of-ideas metaphor. Long-recognized critiques—that
individual recipients of information are not, in fact, always rational market
participants— are increasingly supported by clear social science research
and are coming to a head in particularly powerful ways in the emotiondriven, Post-Truthism media climate. Plainly, consumers of information
243
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do not necessarily behave in the way the U.S. Supreme Court routinely
characterizes them. They often do not thirst for empirical facts, engage in
a truthseeking dialectic, desire to receive information that doesn’t comport
with previously held views, have the cognitive ability to rationally process
information without bias, or possess a capacity to update old positions
based on newer, more correct factual information. In our new,
hyperpartisan, algorithmically determined, information-siloed world, this
may be increasingly the case.
If the most basic premise of the marketplace-of-ideas approach is
sometimes—or even routinely—inaccurate, we might criticize the theory
as inapt and the press protections justified by the model as unwarranted.
But this suggestion misconceptualizes both the ongoing utility of the
marketplace metaphor and the ongoing importance of press functions in a
complex information society. Indeed, rather than undercutting the
rationales for press protection, these information-consumer flaws
underscore the need for vibrant protection of market-enhancing press
institutions. They form the basis for a theory of press protection that
centers on the set of press functions that can directly compensate for these
individual limitations and can advance the search for truth on a population
level even when that search is challenging on an individual level. At this
unique moment for both information distribution and jurisprudential
development, when scholarly attention has turned to the scope and
purpose of the First Amendment’s Press Clause,249 this approach will
prove valuable to the ongoing efforts to doctrinally situate that Clause and
to identify which entities in the new media landscape might invoke its
protections.
A. A Wider Marketplace Inquiry: Why Audience Shortcomings Don’t
Undermine Press Freedom Rationales
The philosophical and jurisprudential origins of the marketplace analogy
and a vibrant body of institutional First Amendment literature all support
an approach that identifies entities as the constitutionally protected “press”
based on their performance of market-enhancing functions that help
compensate for individual information-consumer flaws.
Even the earliest proponents of the marketplace-of-ideas theory
recognized that individual information consumers would not be perfect
truthseekers. Indeed, J.S. Mills, one of the theory’s originators, explicitly
acknowledged that the inherent limitations and biases of human cognition
would impede the search for truth: “Men are not more zealous for truth
than they often are for error.”250 Oliver Wendell Holmes, whose landmark
dissent in Abrams v. United States251 infused the theory into modern
249
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American jurisprudence, was likewise skeptical of the truthseeking
motivations and capabilities of individual information consumers. He was
struck by “how seldom and slowly people yield” to errors in their own
thinking252 and was convinced that society would need more than
individual “rational or empirical refutation” to advance understanding and
knowledge.253
Moreover, the instinct that institutions might be important partners in this
truthseeking endeavor builds on the scholarly scaffolding already erected
by Institutional First Amendment theory, which asserts that in at least
some contexts, societal institutions might serve as intermediating devices
and surrogates for important First Amendment values.254 From a
marketplace-of-ideas approach, this would call for protection of
institutional functions that are uniquely market-enhancing and facilitating
of the flow of information and ideas.255 As Joseph Blocher argued in his
detailed investigation of universities as marketplace-enhancing
institutions, the First Amendment’s solicitude for the operation of the
marketplace of ideas calls for protection of entities that mitigate the costs
of transmitting, receiving, and processing information.256 While
information is being consumed at the individual level, transaction costs are
often defrayed at the institutional level,257 and when this institutional
contribution is cognizable, constitutional protection is warranted.
This institutional recognition is particularly warranted for the press,
because the First Amendment’s Press Clause may provide a unique
doctrinal home for constitutional protection of its function.258 In recent
years, scholars have made compelling arguments, rooted in textualism,
originalism, and pragmatism,259 that the Court should recognize a Press
Clause doctrine separate from and nonredundant to the Speech Clause,
offering protection to a “press” that would not be available to an ordinary
speaker.260 At this critical moment, when important work remains to be
done in theorizing the role of that Clause—and when a rapidly changing
media topography poses challenges for satisfactorily identifying “the
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press”261—the marketplace-of-ideas theory can contribute important
insights to the courts’ functional approach to both issues. A careful
investigation of the market-enhancing functions that might qualify an
entity as the “press” for constitutional purposes can provide one tool for
determining which actors receive that protection.
While press protection is justified for a number of theoretical and
normative reasons that, together, should shape the wider inquiry into who
constitutes the press,262 marketplace-of-ideas analysis can and should
inform this assessment, and may be particularly valuable as the collapse of
once-dominant media structures makes it all the more important that the
inquiry focus on function rather than self-identification or legacy-media
status.
Thus, this inquiry—into whether an entity is performing those core tasks
that make its admittedly imperfect audience of information consumers
better able to participate in marketplace truthseeking—is an important but
as yet unrecognized component of the emerging conversations on the
Press Clause.263 In other words, the Court can jettison its erroneous and
confusing focus on individual behavior and audience capacity without
abandoning the marketplace of ideas as a framework. The theory
continues to have an important place within modern media-law doctrine,
with a new focus on the institutional Press Clause functions that enhance
audience members’ functioning within the marketplace.
B. Identifying “Market-Enhancing” Features of “The Press”
As noted above, the press can improve the search for truth in the
marketplace of ideas by compensating for individual deficiencies in
truthseeking, rational processing, and updating. A careful investigation
and identification of the specific market-enhancing press functions that
serve this goal will help construct a more appropriate marketplace-of-ideas
theory in the press-freedom context and help identify who, in the changing
media topography, qualifies as “the press” under an invigorated Press
Clause doctrine.
While the judicial inquiry into these functions should be ongoing and
might acknowledge new market enhancements as they emerge, a set of
functions commonly served by entities historically thought of as “the
261
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press” can help structure the conversation about how this compensation
for individual limitations operates and why market-enhancing functions
are worthy of constitutional protection.264 Press functions might include,
for example, doing the following tasks on behalf of audience members: (1)
newsgathering, (2) prioritizing, (3) substantiating, (4) educating, and (5)
accessing. As described below, these press functions make the audience
member more likely or more able to engage in truthseeking, to process
information rationally, and to update facts and opinions about the
ramifications of those facts.
1. Newsgathering
The act of newsgathering—of identifying newsworthy questions and then
investigating and reporting their answers to a wider audience—is a
critically important enhancer of the marketplace of ideas. It introduces
market efficiencies by reducing information-collecting costs, informationconsumption costs, and information-transaction costs. In so doing, it
compensates for the now clearly understood tendencies of individual
information consumers to conserve cognitive resources, to struggle with
bounded rationality, and to experience information overload.265
Newsgathering shifts some of the most burdensome truthseeking tasks to
press entities who “devote time, resources, and expertise” to the work of
“informing the public on newsworthy matters.”266 With the press acting as
a market-enhancing partner—“a full participant in public dialogue,
identifying issues, originating ideas, and critiquing the ideas of
others”267—the reader has less work to do. Easily accessible facts,
compiled by those who have engaged in newsgathering, leave the reader
with less need to resort to mental shortcuts that might otherwise hinder the
search for truth.268
Moreover, on behalf of its larger audience, the press representative can
connect with people and information in ways that help audience members
discover, compare, and elucidate ideas more cheaply and efficiently. One
identifying feature of the press is that it “makes it its business to
investigate and obtain additional knowledge initially lacked” by the press
and its audience.269 It would be deeply inefficient for every person in the
town to travel to city hall, fully prepared to ask the mayor thoughtful
questions about the city roads budget, but one reporter can tackle that
information-gathering task on behalf of the whole and enhance the
264
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marketplace of ideas. As repeat players, members of the press often have
superior knowledge about how and where to get information and preexisting relationships with those who possess that information.270 Press
entities that “place calls, ask questions, and seek information” act as
proxies for their audience members, who technically could perform those
tasks, but whose limited time, resources, and cognitive bandwidth mean
they almost certainly will not do so.271 As Justice Powell once noted,
“[f]or most citizens, the prospect of personal familiarity with newsworthy
events is hopelessly unrealistic,” and thus, in “seeking out the news, the
press therefore acts as an agent of the public at large.”272
The market enhancement runs in the opposite direction, as well,
benefitting those from whom the press gathers newsworthy information.
Because “transaction costs are paid not just by those trying to find good
ideas, but by those trying to spread them,” the role of the press as a
disseminator of sources’ ideas is equally important.273 It is a marketenhancing press function to act as a known repository for those who have
information to share, and to thereby enhance “the circulation of
information” 274 on important matters. Information sources who cannot
reasonably deliver their facts to each individual in the community can rely
on trusted press entities to disseminate that information widely.275
Recognition of this function helps explain why some have argued that an
established audience or regular publication are features that should weigh
in favor of a determination that an entity is “the press” for Press Clause
purposes.276
2. Prioritizing
The market-enhancing press function of prioritizing—sifting through large
amounts of potentially interesting or potentially useful information and
curating it for use by individual idea consumers—improves the otherwise
faulty consumer-level operation of the marketplace of ideas. It counteracts
individual consumer deficiencies rooted in inadequate time and cognitive
270
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impart information to journalists willing to publish that information to a wider audience.”)
276
See West, Press Exceptionalism, supra note 276, at 2460 (arguing that “regularity of
publication or a showing of established readership” are relevant to the identification of an
entity as the press for constitutional purposes”).
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resources for digesting the massive quantities of available information,277
thus compensating for some of the key constraints that encourage resort to
heuristics that may not always facilitate truthseeking, rational processing,
or the updating of ideas.
Indeed, gatekeeping is among the functions most commonly recognized as
core to the identification of the press for Press Clause purposes, both as an
historical matter278 and as an ongoing practical matter.279 “In a society in
which each individual has but limited time and resources with which to
observe at first hand,” he has to rely on a market-enhancing press actor “to
bring to him [the information] in convenient form.”280 In the modern “age
of overwhelming information volume,”281 this is true on an everincreasing scale.282 If market enhancement is the guide, offering a clear,
consistent, reliable process to sift through this unmanageable quantity of
information283 is a core function of the constitutional “press.”
The specific nature of this press prioritizing is key to its value to the
marketplace of ideas. Merely reducing the amount of information passed
along to the consumer, even in a curated or tailored way, is not as marketenhancing as prioritization that involves an exercise of editorial
discretion—an application of “journalistic judgment of priorities and
newsworthiness.”284 The press “brings its expertise and judgment to bear
in sifting newsworthy information from that which is not,”285 and it is the
nature of this editorial decisionmaking that so uniquely compensates for
the widest range of individual market failures.286
The prioritizing function draws upon a body of experience in identifying
subjects that are important for citizens and communities, and in so doing,
277

Jones, Press Speakers, supra note 28, at 531 (describing the ways that press helps its
audience “deal with the dual problems of too much speech and too little time or resources
for fully consuming it”).
278
See West, Then and Now, supra note 275, at 85 (providing historical discussion of
“printers as gatekeepers,” who “decided what would and would not be published”).
279
Anderson, supra note 283 at 333 (arguing that the core practical value of news
organizations is that they “sift, select, and package the news, and in so doing create a
community”).
280
Cohn, 420 U.S. at 491.
281
Jones, Press Speakers, supra note 28, at 530.
282
Id. at 531 (“ In our modern world, we now create as much information about every
two days as we did from the dawn of civilization up to 2003. The physical and mental
impossibility of wading through that much information transforms what was once an
added convenience into an absolute necessity. The press speaker’s sifting on behalf of the
listener is now vital”) (internal citations omitted)).
283
Jones & Sun, supra note 37, at 1366 (offering examples of this function of the press
“digest[ing] and synthesiz[ing] the mountains of information that is available”).
284
CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 118 (1973). See also Tornillo,
418 U.S at 241 (protecting the exercise of editorial judgment under the First Amendment).
285
Jones, Press Speakers, supra note 28, at 532.
286
West, Press Exceptionalism, supra note 276 at 2444 (noting that the press “serves a
gatekeeping function by making editorial decisions regarding what is or is not
newsworthy”).
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it “structures public discussion and builds community discourse by
starting conversations and contributing carefully sifted useful information
as these conversations continue.”287 The kind of editorial discretion and
journalistic judgments that truly serve these purposes are likely to be more
market-enhancing than the mere sorting and “prioritization” of
information content that some entities, like search engines, perform today.
These functional differences may aid courts in answering emergent
questions about whether new information-dissemination entities engaged
in algorithmic curation are fulfilling press functions in a way that would
qualify them for special press protections.288
The marketplace-enhancing prioritization function manifests itself not
only in the selection of the news but also in its organization and
presentation. Information consumers rely on the press not just to sift for
what to include but also to signal “which of those included items are more
pressing, more relevant to the listener, or more worthy of attention.”289
This function thus compensates not only for audience members’ limited
time and resources, but also for their limited processing capabilities and
limited “knowledge about the relative significance or magnitude of a piece
of news.”290 In the legacy media, this aspect of the prioritizing function
has been performed quite explicitly, with labels like “breaking news” and
“top story,” and with “headlines, placement, and other signaling devices
offering listeners reliable markers of the institutional press speaker’s
assessment of importance,”291 but the tools by which it could be performed
are not stagnant. Knowing, as we now do, that individual information
consumers struggle with “assigning value and importance to
information,”292 entities that fill that gap enhance the market.
Put differently, the press as institutional speaker makes content-curating
choices that serve as an additional, positive heuristic for press consumers,
287

Jones, Press Speakers, supra note 28, at 532. For a through discussion of the core
function of the press as an organizer of public dialogue and decider of subjects to be
discussed, see Anderson, supra note 283, at 332–33.
288
See Robert Post, Data Privacy and Dignitary Privacy: Google Spain, The Right to Be
Forgotten, and the Construction of the Public Sphere, 67 DUKE LAW J. 981, 1018, 1016
(2018) (arguing that the critical question for proper resolution of the European Court of
Justice case in Google Spain, which held that EU law established a “right to be forgotten”
requiring Google Spain to remove certain search results, is “to determine whether Google
should be invested with the same kind of public interest that we accord to the press,” i.e.,
“whether Google has become, like the modern newspaper, an essential component of the
communicative infrastructure necessary to sustain the public sphere”); cf. Heather
Whitney, Search Engines, Social Media, and the Editorial Analogy, Knight Institute
Emerging Threats Series, 1, 3 (2018) (examining whether “the various choices companies
like Facebook and Google make are indeed analogous to editorial ‘speech’”). Moreover,
while a full exploration of these questions is beyond the scope of this article, we note that
an entity may not be entitled to Press Clause protection simply because it performs one of
the press functions identified in this section.
289
Jones, Press Speakers, supra note 28 at 533.
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who can select the shortcuts they most trust by choosing “from among
available curated speech packages.”293 An audience member “cannot
possibly make all decisions about all possible streams of information, but
… can make the important decision that she, in general, agrees with the
sifting, prioritizing, and other curating values”294 of particular news
organizations. Each news organization’s distinctive mechanism for sifting
what is newsworthy and for prioritizing which items “are more pressing,
more relevant to the listener, or more worthy of attention”295 can be a tool
that inches the information consumer closer to knowledge and closer to
democratic participation. The news-outlet-as-positive-heuristic is thus
market-enhancing and should lead to special protection for institutional
actors who prioritize and package information and engage intellectually on
the audience’s behalf.
3. Substantiating
The press function of substantiating—testing factual information from
other sources to verify, authenticate, and confirm—enhances the
marketplace of ideas and compensates for shortcomings of individual
information consumers. Institutions that perform this corroborative
function consistently over time build reputational goodwill as repeat
players and permit cheaper transaction of information. Indeed, just as
individuals can use the press as a heuristic to access the curated
information package they prefer, they can use a trusted press outlet as a
heuristic for obtaining reliable, verified facts, without having to do that
substantiation themselves. Verification is thus a central market-enhancing
function that can help identify an entity as the press for constitutional
purposes.
Press institutions with clear fact-checking processes superimpose a set of
systemic, population-serving behaviors that an individual information
consumer cannot or will not do for herself. An institutional methodology
demanding investigation of facts before they are published and expecting
assertions to be properly sourced through probing inquiry296 substitutes for
a thorough investigation by individuals, who often lack the cognitive
instincts to challenge information or the motivation to dig for contrary
information. An entity that requires itself to perform this function
advances truthseeking in the wider marketplace of ideas.
Beyond the episodic benefits of finding and substantiating discrete factual
truths, there is more sustained market-enhancing impact when prolonged
performance of this function over time builds institutional reputations for
verification. This reputational factor introduces truthseeking efficiencies
both in the gathering and distributing of information. A press entity with
293

Id. at 534.
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See Jones, Press Speakers, supra note 28, at 522 (describing the “investigative and
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“accountability to its audience” and “attention to professional standards or
ethics”297 develops a reputation for imparting trustworthy, accurate
information and a regular, established audience that continues to demand
those standards of verification.298 As Joseph Blocher has noted, these
repeat-player actions form some of the most obvious parallels between
actual market institutions and marketplace-of-ideas institutions like the
press:299 “In both scenarios, institutions made up of repeat players are
more likely to have communication-enhancing norms,” and “[j]ust like
market actors, repeat speech players are less likely to violate norms, lie, or
break promises, because they know that repeat interactions are
inevitable.”300
Much like the universities that Blocher explored as speech institutions, the
press regularizes relationships, allowing individuals within the system to
rely on an institutional actor with a “reputation for imparting accurate
information,” and thereby “to transact ideas more cheaply.”301 This
efficiency of communication enhances the marketplace in part because
individual press consumers “feel less of a duty to double-check the
information they are receiving” than they would if a random person on a
street corner were shouting the very same information.302 The trust the
press audience members place in the information they receive “saves them
from having to pay what could otherwise be substantial information
costs”303—costs that the cognitive behavior science and psychology
literature tells us the individual almost certainly will not incur.
Additionally, a news outlet’s reputation for fact-verification also reduces
information transmission costs for sources, including anonymous sources,
because their choice of outlet allows them to signal to the wider press
audience that their information is reliable because the news outlet will
have taken appropriate steps to verify it.
In this way, the verification function compensates for many of the
truthseeking and rational processing limitations of individual information
consumers. It engages the core processes of challenging, testing, and
confronting information in ways that are not naturally occurring for the
individual. It improves upon the individual’s limited capacity to update by
preemptively checking, replacing, and updating untruthful information in
the course of newsgathering, well before the information is delivered to
297

West, Press Exceptionalism, supra note 276, at 2444; see also id. at 2457 (noting that
press organizations “are accountable to the public, self-regulating, self-correcting, and
sensitive about adapting to changing times”).
298
Id at 2461 (“regularity of audience and the existence of an established audience ensure
accountability for the press”); CBS v. DNC, 412 U.S. 94, 117 (1973) (noting that the
power of newspapers resides heavily in “the journalistic integrity of its editors and
publishers”).
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Id. at 147.
302
Id.
303
Id.

45

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3588625

the consumer. The reputational integrity of a market-enhancing institution
combats the tendency for emotion-based judgments by creating a pattern
of efficient fact-seeking and fact-trusting by idea consumers. It combats
the effects of motivated reasoning and cognitive dissonance by
establishing a safe and trusted place for counternarratives to flourish.304 A
news consumer who might not otherwise embrace ideas that challenge her
worldview may be more inclined to do so when the institution she has
long trusted with verification insists that its verification process has
disproven the position.
Importantly, a judicial inquiry into whether an entity serves the
verification function—and thus might properly be identified as the press—
is not an inquiry into whether the specific material that the entity
published was true. The latter inquiry oversteps First Amendment bounds
in dangerous ways and harms rather than benefits the marketplace of
ideas. 305 The test is not whether the press was truthful, but rather whether
the press had in place a process for truthseeking— factual investigation,
verification, corroboration, and clarification. Institutions that have such
mechanisms in place of course will not be failsafe; sometimes they will
publish falsehood.306 But the existence of the function counteracts the
individual limitations of consumers in compelling ways and is therefore a
market-enhancing function that helps identify a press actor who may
warrant special protection.
4. Educating and Contextualizing
Educating—developing expertise in learning about matters of public
concern and then providing necessary context when teaching others the
information learned—is a core market-enhancing function that can
identify entities that are serving the press role. While the Post-Truthism
critique rightly observes that audience members struggle on their own to
put factual information to broad and meaningful use, the press’s educative
function helps offset that limitation by making information accessible,
understandable and useable.
The press educative function enhances the marketplace of ideas in two
complementary ways, because the press acts both as a learner, in a proxy
role for individuals who themselves face barriers to full learning, and as a
teacher, interpreting and contextualizing information for individuals who
receive the information. As learners, press entities develop expertise in
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See Jones & Sun, supra note 37, at 1358–59 (describing ways the press’s factchecking function provides important new counternarratives).
305
See W. Virginia St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (prohibiting
governmental control of the content of speech); United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709
(2012) (protecting false speech).
306
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271 (noting that “erroneous statement is inevitable in free
debate”).
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knowledge acquisition.307 Through training and experience, members of
the press know who to ask for information and what to ask of them, and
have structures in place that make them quicker to understand facts that
are provided, more likely to appreciate nuance within those facts, and
better able to probe for pertinent detail and push for clarification than the
average individual audience member. When the press acts as learner, all of
those learning behaviors are still occurring for the wider population,
within a framework of proficiency unmatched and unmatchable on an
individual scale, and this is a market efficiency that can be rewarded with
special protection for press actors.
When the press entity passes along what it has learned to its audience, it
likewise introduces market efficiencies through its teaching role. The role
of the press as educator is widely recognized,308 and like other trusted
educators, the press makes information easier to digest and easier to use.
So, for example, on complicated matters of governmental and public
affairs, the press acts as “one of the great interpreters,”309 contributing to
“public understanding of the rule of law and to comprehension of the
functioning of the entire criminal justice system.”310 This function plays “a
particularly important role in explaining and distributing information
about other institutions whose functioning would otherwise be impossible
for the average citizen to follow.”311 When information that is hard to
understand is made understandable and complexity is simplified, the
marketplace of ideas functions more smoothly—and truthseeking, rational
processing, and updating are all enabled. “Put simply, we rely on the press
to tell us how the world works,”312 because the world works in ways that
are unlikely to be accurately processed without assistance.
The best of this educating involves not only passing along clarified
information, but adding value by “plac[ing] news stories in context
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West, Press Exceptionalism, supra note 276, at 2444 (noting that the press “has
knowledge, often specialized knowledge, about the subject matter at issue”); id. at 2459
(arguing that “training, education, or experience” might be factors relevant to identifying
the press for Press Clause purposes).
308
See, e.g., Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 188–89 (1979) (“The press cases emphasize
the special and constitutionally recognized role of that institution in informing and
educating the public, offering criticism, and providing a forum for discussion and
debate.”) (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 781 (1978));
Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 102 (noting the press serves “the public need for information and
education with respect to the significant issues of the times”).
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Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 250 (“A free press stands as one of the great interpreters
between the government and the people. To allow it to be fettered is to fetter ourselves.”).
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Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 573 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Neb. Press
Ass’n., 427 U.S. at 587).
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Blocher, supra note 271 at 145-6. See also Jones & Sun, supra note 37, at 1361
(describing examples of this function); see also Jones & Sun, supra note 37, at 1361
(describing how “the press as educator teaches about history and current events’ likely
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Jones & Sun, supra note 37 at 1361.
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locally, nationally, or over time.”313 The individual audience member’s
rational processing limitations are such that she otherwise cannot or will
not appreciate the “big picture,” and thus she is likely to reach erroneous
conclusions even from otherwise factual information. But the educative
press function compensates for these shortcomings by “provid[ing]
context and reveal[ing] impact, exposing the story behind the story and
illuminating the nuances beyond the facts.”314 It does this in both
broadening and narrowing ways.315 The broadening contextualization
function expands the audience member’s thinking on an issue by
providing “historical or comparative perspective”316 or additional
background that illuminates the fuller truth that the marketplace seeks to
advance. As David Anderson has noted, this contextualizing—“it was the
fourth murder in the neighborhood this year,” “a study by another group of
scientists reached a different conclusion,” or “this was the third
consecutive quarter of employment gains”317— is core to what it means to
be functioning as the press.318 The narrowing task—for example, telling
the story of a larger issue or policy through the narrative of affected
individuals, a single impacted business, or another illustrative
microcosm—likewise adds insight the audience member could not achieve
alone.
In the aggregate, this educative function promises to offset some of the
gravest limitations of individual audience members. While education is
not a panacea, the marketplace of ideas is unquestionably enhanced when
a reliable, consistent educator provides accurate context and necessary
depth of coverage. The marketplace shortcoming of fundamental error
attribution,319 for example, can be diminished. An assumption that bad
things happen primarily to bad people is more difficult to hold when a
trusted educative narrator is describing the circumstances in which bad
things are happening to good people. System justification320 and the
victim-blaming that attends may be counteracted by context that provides
fuller details of the causes of and solutions to local and national problems.
Cognitive limitations presenting barriers to accurate assessment of hazards
may be softened when press entities contextualize the relative risk of
different threats. An entity that performs the task of learning, and then the
task of interpreting the information it gathers for others,321 places
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West, supra note 276 at 2444.
Anderson, supra note 283 at 333.
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zooming in, to give specific, detailed stories about individuals impacted by wider policy
decisions”).
316
Anderson, supra note 283, at 333 n. 4.
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information in context and lowers the information usability costs for the
fuller marketplace.
5. Accessing
Lastly, the act of accessing—of retrieving records and visiting locations
on behalf of a wider audience—is market-enhancing. When entities
perform this task, they reduce information collection and consumption
costs and offset the individual idea consumer’s tendency to avoid some
fact-gathering. Most importantly, they compensate for serious deficiencies
of time and resources that render impossible or impracticable some
truthseeking on matters of public affairs.322
In a number of important contexts, the entire population possesses the
constitutional or statutory right to access and observe the government “at
first hand.”323 However, for all of the reasons addressed above, the vast
majority of individual citizens are not likely to put these rights to use. An
institutional press entity acting as proxy makes it possible for the rights to
be invoked and for the population to enjoy the substantial benefits of
access—including government accountability and ongoing scrutiny of
procedures conducted in the name of the people.324 Those serving this
market-enhancing function have a stronger claim to identification as “the
press.”
So, for example, “instead of relying on personal observation or reports
from neighbors as in the past, most people receive information concerning
trials through the media.”325 When “firsthand observation” cannot occur,
the individual consumers can rely instead on observations the press
communicates to those not in attendance, with press observers thus
“functioning as surrogates for the public.”326 The same is true when press
entities gather and publish information from public records.327 Indeed,
“[w]ithout the information provided by the press, most of us and many of
our representatives would be unable to vote intelligently or to register
opinions on the administration of government generally.”328 Thus, there is
a marketplace justification for protecting the act of physically standing in
the stead of the wider audience.
How to protect and expand this beneficial proxy access and how to define
who qualifies to perform it are major motivating questions in the
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developing literature on the invigoration of the Press Clause.329
Determining who is “the press” is important so that those truly acting as
surrogates can be “provided special seating and priority of entry so that
they may report what people in attendance have seen and heard”330 in
courtrooms, White House press conferences, and other places where
access is allowed but space limitations and the practicalities of resource
limitations mean the collective whole cannot attend, observe, participate,
or investigate. It may also prove important in an expanded doctrine of
access, because adequately defining the press and fully embracing its
market-enhancing proxy role may call for press access to places where no
broad public access is feasible, such as prisons and immigration detention
centers, but a small set of representative proxies could observe on behalf
of that broader public and thereby create an expanded and more efficient
marketplace of ideas.331
Future scholarship and caselaw might well identify other press functions
that are market-enhancing because they help press audiences compensate
for their individual cognitive biases and limitations. Moreover, additional
factors—derived from other theoretical justifications for press
protection—may also be part of the “holistic” inquiry332 that helps identify
what entities should count as the “press” for purposes of meriting Press
Clause-specific protections.
We recognize, of course, that our proposed approach to addressing the gap
between the Supreme Court’s press audience assumptions and reality is
not a panacea for the impact those limitations have on our truthseeking,
rational processing, and updating capacities. Even when aided by marketenhancing press entities, press audiences will still be composed of flawed
human beings who have limited capacity and desire to objectively seek out
and consume news.
The point of establishing and facilitating a marketplace of ideas is not,
however, to guarantee the emergence of truth over error, but to provide the
best conditions to facilitate the ongoing search for truth and refinement of
public opinion over time. Like J.S. Mill’s, our argument is for establishing
“the optimal conditions for truth-discovery,”333 not embarking on a
quixotic quest for an infallible system that inexorably leads to discovery of
truth.
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See West, Awakening the Press Clause, supra note 265; West, Press Exceptionalism,
supra note 276.
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Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 573.
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. See, e.g., Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 16 (1978) (jails); Saxbe v. Wash. Post
Co., 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974) (prisons); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (same).
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PAUL WRAGG, A FREE AND REGULATED PRESS (2020), at 91 (arguing that Mills’ claim
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C. Confronting Partisanship: Can the Partisan Press Be MarketEnhancing?
The functions addressed above are uniformly market-enhancing. But some
press features that carry the potential to be market-enhancing also carry
the potential to be market-inhibiting, and thus would require more careful
analysis by the Court. Partisanship is the clearest example of such a press
feature.
The Supreme Court has, for at least the last half-century, assumed that the
market-enhancing functions outlined in Part IV.B would be performed by
mainstream media outlets—by widely-trusted, shared, transpartisan,
expert institutional gatekeepers of information334—that would strive to be
accepted arbiters of objective truth.335 Moreover, the Supreme Court’s
case law has assumed, not only that there will be one distinct kind of
entity recognizable as “the press”;336 but that this singular, distinct press
will be serving one distinct set of “public” informational needs, shared by
all and determined by the press as expert gatekeeper. 337 This
undifferentiated “public” would trust “the press” to provide impartial,
objective, and balanced coverage on the “major public issues of our
time.”338
Today, while many people continue to rely on the mainstream press to
perform critical market-enhancing functions,339 the rising popularity of
334

See, e.g., Assoc. Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 131 (1937) (describing the “critical”
roles played by an independent press, including “furnish[ing] unbiased and impartial
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supra note 15 at 746–48.
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Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 585 (quoting Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 250). And in the
context of sought-for access to prisons, we are told that the “free flow of information” to
“the public” best happens through “the press.” Houchins, 438 U.S. at 34 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 275. Another important way the Court manifests its assumption
of transpartisan gatekeepers is by signaling the acceptability of fungible press proxies in
important access cases. In situations where the press might be granted special access on
the public’s behalf, the Court never suggests that multiple proxies with varying partisan
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Most news consumers still “rely heavily” on relatively neutral, mainstream sources of
information. See, e.g., Carnahan et al., supra note 168, at 10 (observing that, “[n]ot
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“partisan press” fundamentally challenges the assumption of a single,
monolithic press audience that will look to the “mainstream media,” as a
shared, trusted source of reliable, objective facts and information. Rather
than relying solely on “traditional news outlets [that] emphasize balance
and objectivity,”340 people increasingly get at least some of their news
from partisan media outlets, “opinionated media”341 that “provide a more
one-sided take on the day’s events”342 and promote particular political
narratives and agendas.343
Of course, partisan media isn’t new. “Indeed, for most of American
history, the news media were partisan media.”344 Still, some might worry
whether—in an age of potential social media echo chambers and
algorithms that reinforce our tendency to choose only congenial news
sources—partisan news sources can serve important “market-enhancing”
functions or whether they will be primarily “market-inhibiting.” And,
indeed, partisan press entities are likely to have more mixed impacts on
the marketplace of ideas than traditional media outlets.
1. Partisanship as a heuristic for preferred prioritization and
curation
First, individuals may employ partisanship as a heuristic for finding press
entities with a particular, identifiable approach to prioritization and
curation. Thus, for example, the existence of partisan news sources can
facilitate individuals’ ability to quickly find and digest information on the
issues they consider most pressing, from the perspective they consider
most interesting, and with the kind of context they consider most relevant.
So understood, reliance on partisan press is a specific instance of the more
general press-as-heuristic phenomenon that aids people’s search for truth
by reducing search costs.345 From this perspective, the proliferation of
news sources generally, and the emergence of partisan press in particular,
can be market-enhancing,346 as partisan outlets provide additional media
surprisingly online political information-seekers, including ideologues, still rely heavily
on sources that are nonideological,” and that in 2012 “around 43% of political
conservatives and 51% of political liberals reported using neutral sources with varying
degrees of regularity”).
340
MATTHEW LEVENDUSKY, HOW PARTISAN MEDIA POLARIZE AMERICA 4 (2013).
341
Id. at 7.
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Id. at 4.
343
Id. at 8 (citation omitted) (observing that, in partisan media, “[s]tories are ‘framed,
spun, and slanted so that certain political agendas are advanced’” and facts are
“present[ed] in such a way to support a particular conclusion”).
344
LEVENDUSKY, supra note 340, at 8.
345
The explosion of available information and media options presumably increases
reliance on this kind of partisan heuristic. See KEVIN ARCENEAUX & MARTIN JOHNSON,
CHANGING MINDS OR CHANGING CHANNELS?: PARTISAN NEWS IN AN AGE OF CHOICE
163-64 (2013).
346
During the heyday of the mainstream press, power to set the national news agenda
was concentrated in the hands of “a small set of media elites,” LEVENDUSKY, supra note
340, at 151, at the expense of a more diverse set of potential voices and audiences. The
emergence of new media outlets that serve niche information needs or investigate issues
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options that clearly signal some important features of their curated news
packages.
An individual who wishes to get a balanced take on the news might use
this partisan signaling to expose herself to arguments on “both sides” of
the partisan divide. Some press consumers may be suspicious of the very
notion of “objectivity” and prefer that their news sources make their
primary biases explicit so that the consumer doesn’t have to spend time
and mental effort trying to identify those biases. This ability to achieve
balanced coverage by consuming a variety of identifiable partisan news
voices is clearly market-enhancing.
Relatedly, partisan media can also serve a market-enhancing function by
reducing search costs for those who affirmatively want to seek out
“counterattitudinal information” that challenges their existing views and
political identity. Thus, for example, a Democrat might seek out an
explicitly Republican media outlet (or vice versa) to probe and challenge
her existing views. Such engagement with counterattitudinal information
is actually quite common.347 Whether that exposure ultimately exacerbates
or mitigates the tendency toward motivational reasoning may depend on
why the person is engaging that material. Research suggests that exposure
to counterattitudinal information tends to further polarize staunch
partisans, perhaps because they seek out the “other side’s perspective”
primarily to engage in the kind of counterargument and defense of existing
views that tends to entrench people’s priors and drive them to take even
more extreme positions.348 In contrast, moderates who engage with
counterattitudinal information appear more interested in true engagement
and more open to revising their existing views in the direction of the
newly acquired information.349
As the last example illustrates, reliance on partisanship as a heuristic for
preferred prioritization is not uniformly market enhancing. Sometimes
individuals will use that heuristic to choose partisan press because they
wish to consume only information that will be ideologically congenial or

and facts that traditional media may have neglected should enhance the overall
marketplace of information.
347
Dustin Carnahan et al., supra note 168, at 10 (observing that “many [experimental]
respondents reported using counterattitudinal sources, with 11% using at least one
counterattitudinal source in the past week in 2008 and 31% reporting use of such source
with varying regularity in 2012” and thus “that counterattitudinal sources continued to be
used among a nontrivial segment of the population despite ample opportunity to do
otherwise”). It is particularly common among those who also seek out proattitudinal
information. Id. at 9 (noting that “[d]espite varied explanations as to why, proattitudinal
site use has been shown to [be] highly correlated with counterattitudinal site use”).
348
See LEVENDUSKY, supra note 340, at 21 (arguing that counterattitudinal (or
“crosscutting” media) “polarize some subjects (those with strong prior attitudes), and
depolarize others (those who find crosscutting media to be highly credible”).
349
See id.
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“proattitudinal”350—information that aligns with and confirms their
partisan priors and thus protects, reinforces, and expresses their partisan
political identities.351 So employed, partisan media is “market-inhibiting”:
it merely exacerbates individuals’ cognitive biases, by facilitating partisan
“motivated reasoning” and more efficient “biased search.”
This type of partisan media consumption can “intensify” motivated
reasoning and thereby entrench and polarize views because proattitudinal
messages—that partisans are already inclined to accept—are presented
without counterargument and thus “seem stronger and even more
persuasive,”352 and because “[p]artisan media’s framing of the news as a
struggle between the two major parties” increases the salience of these
political divisions and “activates viewers’ partisan identities,”353
heightening the motivation to protect and express these identities. Indeed,
some research suggests that consumption of “like-minded” partisan media
makes “viewers become more polarized, more certain their beliefs are the
correct ones, less willing to compromise and support bipartisanship, and
more willing to attribute election victories by the other side to nefarious
motives.”354
2. Partisanship as a heuristic for accurate verification
Rather than seeking out information from a particular partisan perspective,
people who consume partisan media might merely be seeking accurate
350

See Matthew A. Baum & Phil Gussin, In the Eye of the Beholder: How Information
Shortcuts Shape Individual Perceptions of Bias in the Media, 3 QUARTERLY J. OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE 1, 15 (2007) (observing that “a media outlet’s brand name may serve
as a powerful information shortcut” for finding information that is “probably dissonant”
or “probably consonant”).
351
See, e.g., Toby Bolsen et al., The Impact of Message Source on the Effectiveness of
Communications About Climate Change, 41 SCIENCE COMMUNICATION 464-487 (2019)
(“Partisans in pursuit of value-affirming information may . . . turn to sources who share
their group identity or cultural worldviews in seeking out or interpreting any new
information about climate change.”).
352
LEVENDUSKY, supra note 340, at 51.
353
Id. at 52. Partisan media may also promote affective polarization—negative emotions
toward members of opposing political parties—by “activating” and increasing the
salience of political identity and by valorizing party elites’ demonization of political
opponents and members of the opposite party. R. Kelly Garret et al., supra note 358, at 3,
16.
354
LEVENDUSKY, supra note 340, at 136. The extent of this effect is contested,
particularly because it can be difficult to discern whether partisan media drive
polarization or merely reflect it. ARCENEAUX & JOHNSON, supra note 345, at 150
(reporting “evidence that partisan cable news reflects, rather than creates, polarization” in
the American polity). While Levendusky finds substantial evidence that consumption of
partisan media increases polarization, see id., Arceneaux and Johnson argue that the
direct effects of partisan media on polarization are much more limited because many
people opt out of news coverage altogether in favorite of entertainment options and that
the confirmed partisans who seek out partisan coverage are already firmly entrenched in
their views. They argue that the larger experimental effects other researchers observe
occur when people who are otherwise news-avoidant (who would generally choose
entertainment over news) are forced to consume partisan media in unnatural experimental
conditions. See ARCENEAUX & JOHNSON, supra note 345, 150, 152.
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information—pursuing an accuracy, truthseeking goal—by turning to
those sources they believe are the most credible and trustworthy factverifiers,355 with partisanship serving as a heuristic or mediator for source
credibility and trust.356 As Dan Kahan has explained: “Individuals more
readily impute expert knowledge and trustworthiness to information
sources whom they perceive as sharing their worldviews and deny the
same to those whose worldviews they perceive as different from theirs.”357
Indeed, the empirical findings bear out that suggestion that people will
tend to trust information sources that align with their political views and
distrust those that don’t.358 The 2014 Pew Research study that documented
strong partisan differences in news outlet preferences also found that
“ideological differences” about which news sources to trust “are especially
stark.”359
If partisanship were a good proxy for responsible verification of facts, this
heuristic might be market-enhancing shortcut, but there is no reason to
assume this is so. Nonetheless, information consumers’ use of bare
partisanship as a proxy for accuracy and credibility may be unproblematic
if the trusted outlet does, in fact, engage in fact-checking. If it does not,
the situation risks uncritical acceptance of misinformation or
disinformation. In either event, however, the partisan nature of the press
should be largely irrelevant to a court’s determination of whether that
entity engages in market-enhancing verification or not.
There is, however, one important sense in which this heightened trust of
ideologically friendly sources of information may enable the partisan press
to play a unique market-enhancing role: by countering “motivated
reasoning” and thereby making co-partisans more likely to accept
counterattitudinal information. Recent research demonstrates that—on
politicized, controversial issues like climate change—“uncongenial,”
unwelcome, or “counterattitudinal” information—is more likely to be
believed when communicated by co-partisan sources:

355

James N. Druckman & Mary C. McGrath, The Evidence for Motivated Reasoning in
Climate Change Preference Formation, 9 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 111-119 (2019)
(noting that people who believe in climate change might seek out “significantly less
conservative media (which tends to be skeptical of climate change) and more nonconservative media” because they are “accuracy-driven audience members seeking
information from sources they perceive as credible”).
356
See id. (citing research findings that “the very sources that people find credible are the
ones with whom they share common beliefs”).
357
Kahan et al., Cultural Cognition of Scientific Consensus, 14 J. OF RISK RESEARCH 147
(2011).
358
“Partisans are quick to evaluate media messages based on the ideological affiliation of
the source are less likely to be persuaded or otherwise influenced by messages from
attitude-discrepant sources than from attitude-consistent sources.” R. Kelly Garret et al.,
Implications of Pro- and Counterattitudinal Information Exposure for Affective
Polarization, HUMAN COMMUNICATION RESEARCH 1, 4 (2014) (citation omitted).
359
POLITICAL POLARIZATION AND MEDIA HABITS, supra note 177, at 5.
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Partisans making statements that do not align with their
perceived group’s position may draw greater attention to
the frame’s content, may be seen as a ‘costly’ signal
thereby enhancing its perceived honesty and credibility, or
may reduce identity protective forms of motivated
reasoning that would otherwise lead to the rejection of
arguments related to a polarized and highly salient issue
such as climate change.360
Accordingly, when like-minded partisan media report “surprising” facts to
press consumers that cut against the source’s political leanings, that
reporting can “break through the barriers that impede communication
efforts,” persuade skeptical co-partisans, and help build consensus on the
most contentious and politicized of subjects.361
While this kind of reporting might be relatively “rare,”362 when it occurs it
can be a powerful impetus toward truth and is uniquely market-enhancing
because it mitigates and overcomes one of the most tenacious and
intransigent cognitive limitations—our tendency to engage in partisan
motivated reasoning363—in a way that few other things can.364
All told, while we recognize the risks that the growth of partisan media
poses to the marketplace of ideas, the partisan nature of any particular
media outlet does not necessarily preclude it from serving marketenhancing functions. The partisan nature of a media outlet therefore
should not automatically disqualify it from receiving the special
360

Bolsen et al., supra note 351.
Id. (reporting empirical research that “clearly demonstrates the power that trusted ingroup (i.e., in-party leaders) sources could play in overcoming hurdles posed by partisan
polarization on climate change,” altering not beliefs “about the threats that climate
change presents and willingness to support policy action, but also . . . broader
perceptions about [whether climate research is politicized] and even beliefs that climate
change is a hoax”). See also Salil D. Benegal & Lyle A Scruggs, Correcting
Misinformation about Climate Change: The Impact of Partisanship in an Experimental
Setting, 148 CLIMATIC CHANGE 61, 62-63 (2018) (noting that “we should expect
partisans who speak against their own interests to be more powerful persuasive sources
on highly polarized issues” because partisans “who make such statements are engaging in
more potentially costly behavior that lend them additional persuasive value”).
362
LEVENDUSKY, supra note 340, at 20 (“While such counterideological signals provide
voters with valuable information, they are valuable precisely because they are rare.”).
363
See Benegal & Scruggs, supra note 361, at 62 (suggesting that climate-change
messaging featuring Republicans “speaking against their expected partisan positions”
helps “reduce identity-based processing or ‘cultural cognition’ about climate change”)
(citations omitted).
364
Indeed, a fair amount of empirical research suggests that most other potential
techniques for countering motivated reasoning are unlikely to succeed. “Naïve
realism”—the ability to identify the effects of bias and motivated reasoning in others, but
not in one’s self—means that simple exhortations to people to be more “objective” or
“open-minded” may be counterproductive because those reminders may heighten
people’s attention to other’s biases, but not their own. Kahan, supra note 114, at 22-23.
The result may be entrenchment of the belief that one’s own views are “objective,” and
that the differing views of others are fatally compromised by bias. Id.
361
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protections of the press clause, particularly because there are some
market-enhancing functions that partisan media are sometimes particularly
well suited to perform. Of course, partisan entities, like any entities, that
traffic in disinformation and propaganda are market-destructive and
should not qualify for Press Clause protections. Fortunately, there still
seem to be limits to what most media consumers will trust, even when a
source vying for their attention and allegiance is ideologically friendly.
Although Republicans tend to place less trust in “mainstream news”
sources than Democrats, “both Democrats and Republicans gave
mainstream media sources substantially higher trust scores than either
hyperpartisan sites or fake news sites.”365
V.

CONCLUSION

This Post-Truthism moment is an important one—for considering the
actual limitations of information consumers, for assessing how the
jurisprudence of press freedom has been constructed, and for thinking
critically about how it ought to be shaped going forward.
The Supreme Court’s press-freedom case law has been operating on false
assumptions about the capacities, desires, and behaviors of press
audiences, and that gap poses serious challenges to the Court’s conception
of the marketplace of ideas. Rather than undercutting the marketplace
rationales for press protection, however, these limitations heighten the
need to identify and bolster press entities performing market-enhancing
functions that compensate for the individual limitations of information
consumers.
In the end, the refocused marketplace-of-ideas approach we urge here
allows the Court to acknowledge the flaws of individual information
seekers without abandoning the aspiration of fact-based, public reasoning.
It also serves to strengthen the institutions that promote these norms and
suggests to individual information seekers how they can use press
coverage to compensate for their own shortcomings and fulfill their
democratic responsibilities. This function-based approach will be
particularly important in the changing media landscape, allowing the
doctrine to identify and embrace “the press” as it shifts from legacy media
to other methods of newsgathering and news delivery. Protecting
institutions that enhance the marketplace of ideas, whatever their form,
will serve the constitutional goals of the Press Clause and enhance the
search for truth in meaningful ways.
365

Gordon Pennycook & David G. Rand, Fighting Misinformation on Social Media
Using Crowdsourced Judgments of News Source Quality, PNAS Latest Articles (2018) 1,
2, available at https://www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1806781116 (“While these
differences were significantly smaller for Republicans than Democrats, Republicans were
still quite discerning. For example, Republicans trusted mainstream media sources often
seen as left-leaning, such as CNN, MSNBC, or the New York Times, more than wellknown right-leaning hyperpartisan sites like Breitbart or Infowars.”).
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